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 1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Indisputably, people are the real wealth of a nation. Thus, after the millennium 
development goals were adopted in the year 2000, dozens of developing country 
planning ministries, hundreds of international agencies as well as thousands of civil 
society organizations rallied behind them. 
 
However, the world economy continues to emerge slowly from the most serious 
economic crisis of the post world war II period. That is one that has deeply transformed 
the global economy and highlighted the increasingly important role that emerging 
markets as well as developing economies play in the global economy. Yet, the past two 
decades have seen substantial progress in many aspects of human development. 
 
Notably, some people are healthier, live longer, more educated and have more access 
to goods and services. Perhaps, there have also been progresses in expanding 
people’s power to select leaders, influence public decisions and share knowledge 
(ceteris paribus). 
 
Regrettably, these years have seen increasing inequality (both within and across 
countries) as well as production and consumption patterns that have increasingly been 
revealed as unsustainable. Although progress has varied, people in some African 
regions have actually experienced periods (especially in health) of regress. Again, 
aggregate progress in income has varied without convergence. In fact, average rich 
countries have grown faster than the poor ones over the past four decades. Notably, the 
divide between developed and developing countries persists. That is, a small subset of 
countries has remained at the top of the world while the rest of the countries remained 
poor (United Nations, 2010). However, surviving is just one part of leading a long and 
healthy life. Yet, being well nourished is another. Thus, those who survive need to be 
sufficiently well nourished to live decently and fulfill their life plans. Indeed, going to bed 
hungry (or falling asleep due to lack of energy) is one of the most tangible deprivations 
that people can face. 
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Here, nutrition is an aspect of health where income matters. Therefore, hungry people 
who have more money are likely to spend it on food. However, more income does not 
always guarantee proper nutrition while people who are not poor can still go hungry. 
Clearly, differences persists between number of poor people (estimated by dollar a day 
thresholds) and numbers of hungry people. Perhaps, the observed variations reflect 
influences other than income on the nutritional outcomes of family members such as 
maternal health, and education as well as feeding and hygiene practices in the home. 
Again, inadequate nutrition affects the way people (particularly children) acquire 
knowledge and participate in society. It also hampers the ability to work and be 
productive which limits the ability to earn the income needed to lead a decent life. Thus, 
the irreversibility of some health consequences of malnutrition (blindness from vitamin A 
deficiency, physical stunting from protein shortages) reinforces the urgency of 
eradicating hunger. Unfortunately, hunger remains a many-headed monster, behemoth 
and a stubborn one. Paradoxically, while many millions of people have too little to eat, 
millions eat too much. Therefore, income has many shortcomings as a summary 
measure of development. Among its flaws is the neglect of inequality in distribution as 
well as the unsustainability of production patterns. 
 
Nevertheless, people living in poverty, have always expressed how powerless they felt 
because their jobs and livelihood were precarious. In fact, they fear getting sick and lack 
of safety. Again, they experience insecurity, corruption and violence in their homes. 
They are often excluded and abused by society’s institutions. On the other hand, there 
are no transparent, open and responsive government that recognizes their dignity and 
human rights. 
 
Notably, the urban poor wants jobs that is better than selling small items on the street or 
picking through rubbish dumps. And (like people everywhere) they want security so that 
their families can safely go about their lives. Similarly, young people often asked for 
education beyond primary schooling. That is, not just formal learning but life skills and 
vocational training to prepare for jobs. Hey also want access to decent jobs as well as 
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opportunities to lift themselves out of poverty. For businesses, it is not just providing 
good and decent jobs and growth, but delivering essential services as well as helping 
billions of people access clean sustainable energy with climate change adaptation. 
 
Critically, we identify the degrees of hunger, vulnerability and deprivation that shape the 
daily lives of millions of people in the developing countries. At the same time, we are 
shocked by the level of inequality in these economies (both among and within 
countries). Specifically, of all the goods and services consumed globally (per year); the 
one billion people living in extreme poverty account for one percent. In contrast, the 
richest one billion people consume about seventy percent (United Nation, 2013). 
 
Indeed, this is a world of challenges. But these challenges can equally present 
opportunities, if they kindle a new spirit of solidarity, mutual respect and mutual benefit 
(based on our common humanity and RIO principles). Thus, with the increasing pace at 
which domestic markets are becoming integrated into the global economy, the debate 
on income disparities around the developing countries has intensified. Here, an 
interesting side-effect of globalization has been to change the benchmark against which 
people measure their own well-being. In other words, increased international trade 
flows, greater exposure to international travel as well as improved and cheaper 
communication have made it easier for prosperity assessment. Clearly, these 
phenomena are giving more relevance to the concept of global income distribution 
(Bussolo et.al, 2008; Milanovic, 2006). Yet, the common understanding is that the 
recent globalization process has exacerbated inequalities between rich and poor 
countries as well as between rich and poor individuals within countries. 
 
Unlike the previous studies on income distribution, the paper proposes the adoption of 
analytical framework called Global Income Distribution Dynamics (GIDD). Basically, the 
GIDD generates a counterfactual regional income distribution by taking into account the 
expected changes in the age and education structure of the population; worker 
migration from farming to non-farming activities; changes in skilled-to-unskilled and 
farming-to-non-farming wage premiums; as well as different income growth rates across 
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countries (Bussolo, et.al, 2010). Essentially, GIDD based analysis allows us to 
understand how changes in global income distribution are accounted for by changes in 
growth rates across countries as well as changes in income differences within countries. 
This study therefore represents a big leap in our understanding of regional income 
inequality (poverty, hunger and sustainability) as it relates Africa, Pacific and Caribbean 
(ACP) countries.  
 
The rest of the paper is divided into seven sections. Section two presents the overview 
of ACP regional inequality. Regional poverty analysis is the theme of section three while 
section four identifies the regional hunger status of ACP countries. Section five looks at 
productive sustainability concept while regional framework analysis is the subject of 
section six. Resilience policy strategies are recommended in section seven while 
section eight concludes the paper.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


 
2.0 REGIONAL INEQUALITY: ACP EXPERIENCE 
In contrast to the views of other professionals, economists link equity to questions of 
distribution. Yet, the common denominator of these many different views is that equity 
relates to fairness whether (locally in families and communities) or globally across 
nations. Regrettably, political systems do not assign equal weights to everyone’s 
preferences. That is, policies and institutions do not arise from a benign social planner 
who aims to maximize the present value of social welfare. In fact, these are the 
outcomes of political economy processes in which different groups seek to protect their 
own interests. Here, some groups have more power than others while their views 
prevail. However, when the interests of dominant groups are aligned with broader 
collective goals, these decisions are for common good. And when they are not, the 
outcomes need be neither fair nor efficient. 
 
Thus, the interaction of political, economic and socio-cultural inequalities shapes the 
institutions and rules in all societies. Notably, the way these institutions function affects 
people’s opportunities and their ability to invest and prosper. As shown in figure 2.1, 
unequal economic opportunities lead to unequal outcomes and reinforce unequal 
political power (World Bank, 2006). Again, unequal power shapes institutions and 
policies that tend to foster the persistence of the initial conditions. Similarly, the unequal 
distribution of power between the rich and the poor (between dominant and subordinate 
group) helps he rich maintain control over resources. In fact, poor individuals in 
geographically isolated regions as well as racial and ethnic minorities also have less 
political power (and voice) in many countries. Unfortunately, this affects their ability to 
propose and implement policies that would reduce their disadvantages (even if such 
policies might be growth-enhancing for the country). Here, the correlations between the 
unequal distribution of assets, opportunities and political power give rise to a circular 
flow of mutually reinforcing patterns of inequality. Unfortunately, such a flow and its 
associated feedback loop help inequalities persist over long periods (even if they are 
inefficient and deemed unfair by a majority of the population). 
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FIG 2.1 INEQUALITIES INTERACTION SCHEME: POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND 
SOCIO CULTURAL. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          INSTITUTION 
 
 
 
 
 
Clearly, economic and political inequalities are particularly embedded in unequal social 
and cultural institutions. In other words, the social networks that the poor have access to 
are substantially different from those that the rich can tap into. In contrast, the rich are 
bequeathed with much more economically productive social networks that maintain 
economic rank. However, social networks are closely allied with culture. Yet, 
subordinate groups may face adverse terms of recognition (that is, the framework within 
which they negotiate their interactions with other social groups). Regionally, individuals 
and groups face highly unequal opportunities to better themselves economically and 
socially. Because education and wealth help a person gain influence in society, voice 
and political power are also generally thought to be correlated with economic well-being. 
Therefore, the interaction between these mutually reinforcing economic, social and 
political inequalities perpetuates them across generations. Notably, there are three 
competing concepts of inequality: global, international and inter country. For the global 
inequality definition, line up all citizens of the world and calculate the inequality in the 
distribution of their real incomes (adjusted for purchasing power parity). Here, the global 
inequality measures that belong to the general entropy class (such as a mean log 
deviation or Theil’s index) can be neatly decomposed into inequality attributable to 
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inequalities between persons within each country as well as the mean differences of 
income between countries (Shorrocks, 1980). 
 
On the other hand, within-country inequality is what the overall inequality in the world 
would be if there were no differences in mean consumption across countries but each 
country had its actual inequality level. Basically, between-country inequality can be 
interpreted as measuring what the level of inequality in the world would be if everyone 
within each country had the same consumption level (as given by the country average). 
Thus, the total inequality in the world is the sum of these two parts while the ratios of the 
respective parts to total inequality provide a measure of the percentage contribution of 
between-country as well as within-country inequality to total inequality.  
 
For international inequality, each person has his or her country’s mean income. 
Operationally, one can refer to the between-country inequality as international inequality 
(that is inequality in the distribution of all of the world’s citizens) but with each person 
assigned the mean income of his or her country instead of his or her own income. Here, 
global inequality is calculated by simply adding international inequality to within-country 
inequality. However, as the third major concept, the implicit value judgment in using 
inter-country inequality instead of international inequality is that countries (not people) 
should get equal weight in assessing the fairness of the division of the gains from 
globalization. On one hand, the measures most widely quoted treat each country as one 
observation. On the other hand, the decompositions of world inequality into between-
country and within-country components give people equal weight (World Bank, 2006). 
 
Essentially, the Human development index (HDI) presents averages concealing wide 
disparities in human development across people in a country. However, United Nations 
(2010) have constructed the Inequality Adjusted-Human Development Index (IHDI) to 
be directly comparable to the HDI (reflecting inequality in each dimension of the IHDI for 
a large number of countries). In fact, the IHDI has desirable statistical properties for 
cross-country estimates that enable combination of data from different sources (such as 
health data from life tables as well as income data from household surveys). Clearly, the 
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IHDI takes into account not only a country’s average human development (as measured 
by health, education and income indicators but also how it is distributed). Here, we can 
think of each individual in a society as having a personal HDI. Operationally, there are 
differences across people and the average HDI differs from personal HDI levels. Thus, 
the IHDI accounts for inequalities in life expectancy, schooling and income by 
“discounting” each dimension’s average value according to its level of inequality. 
However, the IHDI will be equal to the HDI when there is no inequality across people 
but falls further below the HDI as inequality rises. Consequently, the HDI can be viewed 
as an index of potential human development or the maximum IHDI that could be 
achieved if there were no inequality. On the other hand, the IHDI is the actual level of 
human development accounting for inequality. Therefore, the difference between the 
HDI and the IHDI measures the “loss” in potential human development due to inequality. 
 
Generally, table 2.1 shows the total loss in human development due to multidimensional 
inequalities as well as the loss in each dimension and the effects of inequality on 
country HDI rank. Here, countries with less human development have more multi-
dimensional inequality (and thus larger losses in human development) though there is 
significant variation. Regrettably, people in sub-Saharan Africa suffer the largest HDI 
losses because of substantial inequality across all three dimensions. Specifically, the 
Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite index measuring average achievement 
in three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, knowledge 
and decent standard of living.  
 
As a summary, measure of human development, HDI measures the average 
achievements in a country in the above three basic dimensions of human development. 
Computationally, the HDI is the geometric means of normalized indices measuring 
achievements in each dimension. Here, the first step is to create sub-indices for each 
dimension. Here, minimum and maximum values (goal posts) need to be set in order to 
transform the indicators into indices between 0 and 1 (United Nations, 2010).  
 
TABLE 2.1.  COMPARATIVE INEQUALITY (ADJUSTED) HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
INDEX: SCP COUNTRIES DATA. 
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A B C D E F G H I J 
S/N COUNTRIES REGION SUB REGION INCOME 
STATUS 
HDI 
RANK 
2010 
HDI 
VALUE 
2010 
INEQUALITY-ADJUSTED HDI 
VALUE 
2010 
OVERALL 
LOSS 
% 
CHANGE 
IN RANK 
  % 
1 ANGOLA SUBSAHARAN CENTRAL AFRICA LMC 140 0.403 0.242 39.9 -4 
2 ANTIGUA AND 
BARBUDA 
CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN 
AMERICA 
UMC - - - - - 
3 BAHAMAS, THE CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN 
AMERICA 
HIC 43 0.784 0.671 14.4 -4 
4 BARBADOS CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN 
AMERICA 
HIC 42 0.788 - - - 
5 BELIZE CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN 
AMERICA 
LMC 78 0.694 0.495 28.7 -16 
6 BENIN SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LIC 134 0.435 0.282 35.2 -5 
7 BOTSWANA SUBSAHARAN SOUTHERN 
AFRICA 
UMC 98 0.633 - - - 
8 BURKINA FASO SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LIC 161 0.305 0.195 36.2 3 
9 BURUNDI SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIC 166 0.282 0.177 37.0 2 
10 CAMEROON SUBSAHARAN CENTRAL AFRICA LMC 131 0.460 0.304 33.9 -1 
11 CAPE VERDE SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LMC 118 0.534 - - - 
12 CENTRAL 
AFRICAN 
REPUBLIC 
SUBSAHARAN CENTRAL AFRICA LIC 159 0.315 0.183 42.0 -3 
13 CHAD SUBSAHARAN CENTRAL AFRICA LIC 163 0.295 0.179 39.3 0 
14 COMOROS SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIC 140 0.428 0.240 43.9 -11 
15 DEM. REP OF 
CONGO 
SUBSAHARAN CENTRAL AFRICA LIC 168 0.239 0.153 36.2 0 
16 CONGO SUBSAHARAN CENTRAL AFRICA LMC 126 0.489 0.334 31.8 0 
17 COOK ISLANDS PACIFIC POLYNESIA 
OCEANIA 
- - - - - - 
18 COTE D’IVOIRE SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LMC 149 0.397 0.254 36.1 3 
19 DJIBOUTI SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LMC 147 0.402 0.252 37.3 6 
20 DOMINICA CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN 
AMERICA 
UMC - - - - - 
21 DOMINICAN 
REPUBLIC 
CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN 
AMERICA 
UMC 88 0.663 0.499 24.8 -7 
22 EQUATORIAL 
GUNINEA 
SUBSAHARAN CENTRAL AFRICA LIC 117 0.538 - - - 
23 ERITREA SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIC - - - - - 
24 ETHIOPIA SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIC 157 0.328 0.216 34.3 1 
25 FIJI PACIFIC MELANESIA 
OCEANIA 
UMC 86 0.669 - - - 
26 GABON SUBSAHARAN CENTRAL AFRICA UMC 93 0.648 0.512 21.0 5 
27 GAMBIA SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LIC 151 0.390 0.238 39.0 -2 
28 GHANA SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LIC 130 0.467 0.349 25.4 7 
29 GRENADA CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN 
AMERICA 
UMC - - - - - 
30 GUINEA SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LIC 156 0.340 0.209 38.4 -1 
31 GUINEA-
BISSAU 
SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LIC 164 0.289 0.166 42.4 -2 
A B C D E F G H I J 
S/N COUNTRIES REGION SUB REGION INCOME 
STATUS 
HDI 
RANK 
HDI 
VALUE 
INEQUALITY-ADJUSTED HDI 
VALUE OVERALL CHANGE 


2010 2010 2010 LOSS 
% 
IN RANK 
% 
32 GUYANA CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN 
AMERICA 
LMC 104 0.611 0.497 18.6 7 
33 HAITI CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN 
AMERICA 
LIC 145 0.404 0.239 40.8 -7 
34 JAMAICA CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN 
AMERICA 
UMC 80 0.688 0.574 16.6 9 
35 KENYA SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIC 128 0.470 0.320 31.9 -1 
36 KIRIBATI PACIFIC MICRONESIA 
OCEANIA 
LMC - - - - - 
37 LESOTHO SUBSAHARAN SOUTHERN 
AFRICA 
LMC 141 0.427 0.282 34.0 0 
38 LIBERIA SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LIC 162 0.300 0.188 37.3 1 
39 MADAGASCAR SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIC 135 0.435 0.308 29.2 3 
40 MALAWI SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIC 153 0.385 0.261 32.1 8 
41 MALI SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LIC 160 0.309 0.191 38.3 0 
42 MARSHALL 
ISLANDS 
PACIFIC MICRONESIA 
OCEANIA 
LMC - - - - - 
43 MAURITANIA SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LIC 136 0.433 0.281 35.1 -5 
44 MAURITIUS SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA UMC 72 0.701 - - - 
45 MICRONESIA FED. 
STATES 
PACIFIC MICRONESIA 
OCEANIA 
LMC 103 0.614 0.375 39.0 -11 
46 MOZAMBIQUE SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIC 165 0.284 0.155 45.0 -2 
47 NAMIBIA SUBSAHARAN SOUTHERN 
AFRICA 
UMC 105 0.606 0.338 44.3 -15 
48 NAURU PACIFIC MICRONESIA 
OCEANIA 
- - - - - - 
49 NIGER SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LIC 167 0.261 0.173 33.9 2 
50 NIGERIA SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LMC 142 0.423 0.246 41.7 -6 
51 NILE PACIFIC POLYNESIA 
OCEANIA 
- - - - - - 
52 PALAU PACIFIC MICRONESIA 
OCEANIA 
UMC - - - - - 
53 PAPUA NEW 
GUINEA 
PACIFIC MELANESIA 
OCEANIA 
LMC 137 0.431 - - - 
54 RWANDA SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIC 152 0.385 0.243 37.0 3 
55 SAINT KITTS/NEVIS CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN 
AMERICA 
UMC - - - - - 
56 SAINT LUCIA CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN 
AMERICA 
UMC - - - - - 
57 SAINT VINCENT/ 
GRENADINES 
CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN 
AMERICA 
UMC - - - - - 
58 SAMAO PACIFIC POLYNESIA 
OCEANIA 
LMC - - - - - 
59 SAOTOME/PRINCI
PE 
SUBSAHARAN CENTRAL AFRICA LMC 127 0.488 - - - 
60 SENEGAL SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LMC 144 0.411 0.262 36.2 0 
61 SEYCHELLES SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA UMC - - - - - 
62 SIERRA LEONE SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LIC 158 0.317 0.193 39.3 -1 
A B C D E F G H I J 
S/N COUNTRIES REGION SUB REGION INCOME 
STATUS 
HDI 
RANK 
HDI 
VALUE 
INEQUALITY-ADJUSTED HDI 
VALUE OVERALL CHANGE 


2010 2010 2010 LOSS 
% 
IN RANK 
% 
63 SOLOMON ISLAND PACIFIC MELANESIA 
OCEANIA 
LIC 123 0.494 - - - 
64 SOMALIA SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIC - - - - - 
65 SUDAN SUBSAHARAN NORTH AFRICA LMC 154 0.379 - - - 
66 SURINAME CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN 
AMERICA 
UMC 94 0.646 0.489 24.3 -7 
67 SWAZILAND SUBSAHARAN SOUTHERN 
AFRICA 
LMC 121 0.498 0.320 35.7 -7 
68 TANZANIA SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIC 148 0.398 0.285 28.4 9 
69 TIMOR LESTE PACIFIC OCEANIA  120 0.502 0.334 33.3 -4 
70 TOGO SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LIC 139 0.428 0.287 32.9 2 
71 TONGA PACIFIC POLYNESIA 
OCEANIA 
LMC 85 0.677 - - - 
72 TRINIDAD AND 
TOBAGO 
CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN 
AMERICA 
HIC 59 0.736 0.621 15.5 -2 
73 TUVALU PACIFIC POLYNESIA 
OCEANIA 
LMC - - - - - 
74 UGANDA SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIV 143 0.422 0.286 32.1 5 
75 VANUATU PACIFIC MELANESIA 
OCEANIA 
LMC - - - - - 
76 ZAMBIA SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIC - - - - - 
77 ZIMBABWE SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIC 169 0.140 0.098 29.9 0 
78 OECD REGIONAL INTERNATIONAL HIC - 0.879 0.789 10.2 - 
79 NON-OECD REGIONAL INTERNATIONAL HIC - 0.844 0.756 10.5 - 
80 SSA REGIONAL INTERNATIONAL LIC - 0.389 0.261 32.8 - 
81 LDC REGIONAL INTERNATIONAL LIC - 0.386 0.263 31.9 - 
82 WORLD GLOBAL WORLDWIDE HIC/LIC - 0.624 0.489 21.7 - 
 
NOTE: LMC   = Low Middle Income Country 
UMC   = Upper Middle Income Country 
HIC   = High-Income Country 
LIC   = Low-Income Country 
SSA   = SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
LDC   = LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
OECD   = ORGANIZATION OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND 
    DEVELOPMENT 
Income Status          = Economies are divided among income groups according to 2009 GNI per capita 
(calculated using World bank Atlas Method): 
LIC Group  = US $395< 
LMC Group  = US $996 – 3945 
UMC Group  = US $3946 – 12,195 
HIC Group  = US $12, 196 > 
 
 
SUBSAHARAN COUNTRIES = 47 
PACIFIC COUNTRIES  = 15 
CARRIBEAN COUNTRIES = 15 
 
And because the geometric mean is used for aggregation, the maximum value does not 
affect the relative comparison (in percentage terms) between any two countries or 
periods of time. Here, the maximum values are set to the actual observed maximum 
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values of the indicators from the countries in the time series (1980-2010). In contrast, 
the minimum values will affect comparisons, so values that can be approximately 
conceived of as subsistence values or natural zeros are used. Thus, progress is 
measured against minimum levels that a society needs to survive overtime. Clearly, the 
minimum values are set at twenty years for life expectancy; at zero years for both 
education variables as well as at 163 for per capita gross national income (GNI). And 
having defined the minimum and maximum values, the sub-indices are calculated as 
follows: 
 
Dimension index = 		


	


		


	    (2.1) 
 
Therefore, the HDI is the geometric mean of the three dimension indices: 
	  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
	       (2.2) 
 
Indeed, expression (2.2) embodies imperfect sustainability across all HDI dimensions. 
However, the Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI) adjusts the Human 
Development Index (HDI) for inequality in distribution of each dimension across the 
population. 
 
Essentially, IHDI is based on a distribution-sensitive class of composite indices as 
proposed by Foster, et al (2005), which draws on the Atkinson (1970) family of 
inequality measures. Basically, it is computed as a geometric mean of geometric means 
that is calculated across the population for each dimension separately (Alkire and 
Foster, 2010). Here, the IHDI accounts for inequalities in HDI dimensions by 
“discounting each dimension’s average value according to its level of inequality). 
Practically, the IHDI equals the HDI when there is no inequality across people. But, this 
may be less than the HDI as inequality rises. Thus, the IHDI is the actual level of human 
development (accounting for the observed inequality). On the other hand, the HDI can 
be viewed as an index of potential human development (or the maximum level of HDI) 
that could be achieved if there was no inequality. Therefore, the loss in potential human 
development due to inequality is given by the difference between the HDI and the IHDI 
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(which can be expressed as a percentage). Computationally, the IHDI draws from the 
family of inequality measures and sets the aversion parameter ∑ equal to I. 
consequently, the inequality measure is 
 
A – I -             (2.3) 
Where g is the geometric mean and 
            is the arithmetic mean of the distribution. 
Symbolically, this can be written as 
 
Ax = I -   	  
_____________   (2.4) 
X 
 
Where {x1,…,Xn}  denotes the underlying distribution in the dimensions of 
interest 
 
Ax  is obtained for each variable (life expectancy, years of 
schooling and disposable income or consumption per capita) 
using household survey data as well as life table. 
 
Again, the mean achievement in a dimension (X) is adjusted for inequality as follows: 
 
X* = X (I – Ax) =  	         (2.5) 
 
Therefore X (geometric mean of the distribution) reduces the mean according to the 
inequality in distribution as well as emphasizing the lower end of the distribution. 
Similarly, the inequality adjusted dimension indices (IIx) are obtained from the HDI 
dimension indices (Ix) by multiplying them by (I – Ax), where Ax is the corresponding 
Atkinson measure: 
 
IIx = (I – Ax) . Ix        (2.6) 

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Here, the inequality-adjusted income index (I*income) is based on the unlogged gross 
national income (GNI) index, I*income. Clearly, this enables the IHDI to account for the 
full effect of income inequality. 
 
In the final analysis, the IHDI is the geometric mean of the three dimension indices 
adjusted for inequality as follows: 
 
IHDI = !" # $%	&'(	)*+,-./0123	4	& #	$
3 ” HDI     (2.7) 
 
Clearly, (2.7) represents the Human development index value adjusted for inequalities 
in the three basic dimensions of human development (that is comparatively reported for 
sub-Saharan, pacific and Caribbean countries). Regrettably, the regional data shows a 
high degree of inequality as well as poor human development among the people of 
these regions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.0. REGIONAL POVERTY: ACP EXPERIENCE 
 
Undisputedly, poverty amid plenty is the world’s greatest challenge. In fact, the poor 
people live without fundamental freedoms of action and choice that the better off take 
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for granted. They often lack adequate food and shelter, education and health as well as 
deprivations that keep them from leading the kind of life that everyone values. Again, 
they face extreme vulnerability to ill-health, economic dislocation and natural disasters. 
And often, they are exposed to ill treatment by institutions of the state and society as 
well as being powerless to influence key decisions affecting their lives. Regrettably, all 
these are the dimensions of poverty (World Bank, 2001). Indeed, poor people are 
particularly vulnerable to adverse events outside their control. That is, they are often 
treated badly by the institutions of state and society as well as being excluded from 
voice and power in those institutions. 
 
On one hand, one route for investigating the causes of poverty is to examine the 
dimensions highlighted by poor people: 
(A) Lack of income and assets to attain basic necessities (food, shelter, clothing, as well 
as acceptable levels of health and education); 
(B) Sense of voicelessness and powerlessness in the institutions of state and society; 
and  
(C) Vulnerability to adverse shocks, linked to as inability to cope with them. 
 
On the other hand, to understand the determinants of poverty in all its dimensions, it 
helps to think in terms of people’s assets, productivity of these assets as well as the 
volatility of returns. Notably, these assets are of several kinds: 
(I) Human assets (such as the capacity for basic labor, skills, and good health); 
(II) Natural Assets (such as land); 
(III) Physical assets (such as access to infrastructure); 
(IV) Financial assets (such as savings and access to credit); 
(V) Social assets (such as network of contacts and reciprocal obligations that can be 
called on in time of need as well as political influence over resources. 
Clearly, the returns to these assets depend on access to markets as well as all the 
global, national and local influences on returns in these markets.  But these returns 
depend not just on the behavior of markets. They also depend on the performance of 
institutions of state and society. Yet, underlying asset ownership and returns to assets 
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are not only economic but also fundamental political and social forces. Here, access to 
assets depends on a legal structure that defines and enforces private property rights as 
well as on customary norms that define common property resources. Again access may 
be affected by implicit and explicit discrimination on the basis of gender, ethnicity, race, 
or social status. However, access to assets and returns to assets are affected by public 
policy and state interventions (which are shaped by the political influence of different 
groups). Indeed, lacking assets is both a cause and an outcome of poverty. In other 
words, poor health, deficient skills, scant access to basic services as well as the 
humiliations of social exclusion reflects deprivations in personal, public and social 
assets. Also, human, physical and natural assets lie at the core of whether as individual, 
household or group lives in poverty (or escapes it). Thus, these assets interact with 
market and social opportunities to generate income, better quality of life and a sense of 
psychological well-being. 
 
Regrettably, poor people have few assets in part because they live in poor countries or 
in poor areas within countries. They also lack assets because of stark inequalities in the 
distribution of wealth as well as the benefits of public action. However, poor women and 
men have stressed that officials are often unresponsive to them. They have shared 
countless examples of criminality, abuse and corruption in their encounters with public 
institutions and concluded that they have little recourse to justice. In describing their 
encounters with institutions, poor people have also drawn attention to the shame and 
indignity of being treated with arrogance, rudeness and disdain. Notably, social 
institutions (kinship systems, community organizations, and informal networks) greatly 
affect poverty outcomes. Here, they do so by affecting the productivity of economic 
assets; strategies for coping with risk, capacity to pursue new opportunities as well as 
the extent to which particular voices are heard when important decisions are made. 
Nevertheless, discrimination on the basis of gender, ethnicity, race, religion or social 
status can lead to social exclusion while locking people in long-term poverty traps. 
 
However, values, norms and social institutions may reinforce persistent inequalities 
between groups in society (as with gender-based prejudice throughout much of the 
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world). Again, economic inequalities reinforced by social barriers make it especially 
difficult for poor people to move out of poverty. In other words, when social distinctions 
between groups are used to perpetuate inequalities in access to material resources; 
they generate rigid sociopolitical hierarchies that constitute powerful social barriers 
explicitly aimed at preserving the status of the better-off. Consequently, they place 
crippling constraints on individuals. 
 
Naturally, for poor people risk averse because they live close to the margin of survival 
and the prospects of incurring the wrath of powerful elites by challenging these barriers 
is intimidating. On the other hand, rigid stratification creates obstacles to collective 
action. That is, if the distribution of power in a community is too skewed, prospects for 
trust and cooperation are low. In its most extreme form and under conditions of 
economic deprivation (and non-democratic government) ethnic fragmentation can 
descend into civil conflict. 
 
Indeed, the civil conflict is both a cause and a consequence of poor economic 
performance. Yet, the most important cost of civil conflict is loss of life (humanitarian 
tragedy). Notably, civil conflict can accelerate the collapse of the state 
disproportionately hurting poor people. Here, the problems of civil conflicts may spill 
across borders while increasing the burdens of neighboring countries. Thus, a focus on 
deprivation is fundamental to human development. 
 
Clearly, the dimension of poverty goes far beyond inadequate income. Rather, it 
includes poor health and nutrition; low education and skills; inadequate livelihoods, bad 
housing conditions; social exclusion and lack of participation. In general, experienced by 
people around the world, poverty is obviously multifaceted as well as multidimensional. 
Here, money-based measures are obviously important, but deprivations in other 
dimensions and their overlap also need to be considered. This is because of the fact 
that households facing multiple deprivations are likely to be in worse situations than 
income poverty measures suggest. Essentially, the multidimensional poverty index 
(MPI) is grounded in the capability approach and it includes an array of dimensions from 
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participatory exercises among poor communities as well as emerging international 
consensus. However, because the measure requires that all data pertain to the same 
household, the options of dimension are limited. Although simple and policy relevant, 
MPI complements monetary-based methods by taking a broader approach. In fact, it 
identifies overlapping deprivations at the household level across the same three 
dimensions as the house development index (HDI). Therefore, it shows the average 
number of poor people and deprivations with which poor households contend. Table 3.1 
shows the set of estimates related to the multidimensional poverty index for all the sub-
Saharan, Caribbean and pacific countries of the study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 3.1. COMPARATIVE MULTIDIMENSIONAL POVERTY INDEX: ACP 
COUNTRIES DATA 
A B C D E F G H I J 
S/N COUNTRIES REGION SUB REGION INCOME 
STATUS 
MULTIDIMENSIO
NAL POVERTY 
INDEX 2000-2008 
POPULATION 
IN 
HEADCOUNT 
(%) 2000-2008 
                                                                         
 
MPI 
DEPRIVATION 
(%) 2000-2008 
POPULATION 
MPI RISK (%) 
2008-2008 
MPI 
2013 
 
VALUE 
 
 
 
2000 
1 ANGOLA SUBSAHARAN CENTRAL AFRICA LMC 0.452 77.4 58.4 10.7 - - 


2 ANTIGUA AND 
BARBUDA 
CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN AMERICA UMC -- - - - - - 
3 BAHAMAS, THE CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN AMERICA HIC - - - - - - 
4 BARBADOS CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN AMERICA HIC - - - - - - 
5 BELIZE CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN AMERICA LMC 0.024 5.6 42.6 7.6 0.024 16 
6 BENIN SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LIC 0.412 72.0 57.3 13.2 0.412 5652 
7 BOTSWANA SUBSAHARAN SOUTHERN AFRICA UMC - - - - - - 
8 BURKINA FASO SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LIC 0.536 82.6 64.9 8.6 0.535 12282 
9 BURUNDI SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIC 0.530 84.5 62.7 12.2 0.530 6127 
10 CAMEROON SUBSAHARAN CENTRAL AFRICA LMC 0.299 54.6 54.7 18.3 0.287 9149 
11 CAPE VERDE SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LMC - - - - - - 
12 CENTRAL AFRICAN 
REPUBLIC 
SUBSAHARAN CENTRAL AFRICA LIC 0.512 86.4 59.3 7.6 - - 
13 CHAD SUBSAHARAN CENTRAL AFRICA LIC 0.344 62.9 54.7 28.2 0.344 5758 
14 COMOROS SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIC - - - - - - 
15 DEM. REP OF 
CONGO 
SUBSAHARAN CENTRAL AFRICA LIC 0.393 73.2 53.7 16.1 0.392 44971 
16 CONGO SUBSAHARAN CENTRAL AFRICA LMC 0.270 55.9 48.4 22.5 0.208 1600 
17 COOK ISLANDS PACIFIC POLYNESIA OCEANIA - - - - - - - 
18 COTE D’IVOIRE SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LMC 0.320 52.2 61.4 16.4 0.353 11083 
19 DJIBOUTI SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LMC - - - - 0.139 241 
20 DOMINICA CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN AMERICA UMC - - - - - - 
21 DOMINICAN 
REPUBLIC 
CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN AMERICA UMC - - - - 0.018 438 
22 EQUATORIAL 
GUNINEA 
SUBSAHARAN CENTRAL AFRICA LIC - - - - - - 
23 ERITREA SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIC - - - - - - 
24 ETHIOPIA SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIC 0.582 90.0 64.7 5.2 0.564 72415 
25 FIJI PACIFIC MELANESIA OCEANIA UMC - - - - - - 
26 GABON SUBSAHARAN CENTRAL AFRICA UMC 0.161 35.4 45.5 22.4 - - 
27 GAMBIA SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LIC 0.324 60.4 53.6 17.6 0.324 934 
28 GHANA SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LIC 0.140 30.1 46.4 21.4 0.144 7258 
29 GRENADA CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN AMERICA UMC - - - - - - 
30 GUINEA SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LIC 0.505 82.4 61.3 9.4 0.506 7459 
31 GUINEA-BISSAU SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LIC - - - - - - 
32 GUYANA CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN 
AMERICA 
LMC - - - - 0.030 58 
33 HAITI CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN 
AMERICA 
LIC - - - - 0.299 5346 
34 JAMAICA CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN 
AMERICA 
UMC - - - - - - 
35 KENYA SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIC 0.302 60.4 50.0 23.2 0.299 18863 
36 KIRIBATI PACIFIC MICRONESIA 
OCEANIA 
LMC - - - - - - 
37 LESOTHO SUBSAHARAN SOUTHERN 
AFRICA 
LMC 0.220 48.1 45.8 27.5 0.156 759 
38 LIBERIA SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LIC 0.484 83.9 57.7 9.5 0.485 2917 
39 MADAGASCAR SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIC 0.413 70.5 58.5 14.8 0.357 13463 
40 MALAWI SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIC 0.384 72.3 53.2 19.8 0.334 9939 
A B C D E F G H I J 
S/N COUNTRIES REGION SUB REGION INCOME 
STATUS 
MULTIDIMENSIO
NAL POVERTY 
INDEX 2000-2008 
POPULATION 
IN 
HEADCOUNT 
(%) 2000-2008 
                                                                         
MPI 
DEPRIVATION 
(%) 2000-2008 
POPULATION
MPI RISK (%)  
2008--2008 
MPI 
2013 
 
VALUE 
 
 
 
2000 
41 MALI SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LIC - - - - 0.558 11772 
42 MARSHALL ISLANDS PACIFIC MICRONESIA 
OCEANIA 
LMC - - - - - - 
43 MAURITANIA SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LIC 0.352 61.7 57.1 15.1 0.352 1982 
44 MAURITIUS SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA UMC - - - - - - 
45 MICRONESIA FED. PACIFIC MICRONESIA LMC - - - - - - 
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STATES OCEANIA 
46 MOZAMBIQUE SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIC 0.481 79.8 60.3 9.8 0.512 18127 
47 NAMIBIA SUBSAHARAN SOUTHERN 
AFRICA 
UMC 0.187 39.6 47.2 23.5 0.187 855 
48 NAURU PACIFIC MICRONESIA 
OCEANIA 
- - - - - - - 
49 NIGER SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LIC 0.642 92.7 69.3 4.0 0.642 12437 
50 NIGERIA SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LMC 0.368 63.5 57.9 15.7 0.310 81510 
51 NILE PACIFIC POLYNESIA OCEANIA - - - - - - - 
52 PALAU PACIFIC MICRONESIA 
OCEANIA 
UMC - - - - - - 
53 PAPUA NEW GUINEA PACIFIC MELANESIA OCEANIA LMC - - - - - - 
54 RWANDA SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIC 0.443 81.4 54.4 14.0 0.350 7331 
55 SAINT KITTS/NEVIS CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN AMERICA UMC - - - - - - 
56 SAINT LUCIA CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN AMERICA UMC - - - - - - 
57 SAINT VINCENT/ 
GRENADINES 
CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN AMERICA UMC - - - - - - 
58 SAMAO PACIFIC POLYNESIA OCEANIA LMC - - - - - - 
59 SAOTOME/PRINCIPE SUBSAHARAN CENTRAL AFRICA LMC 0.236 51.6 45.8 23.9 0.154 56 
60 SENEGAL SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LMC 0.384 66.9 57.4 11.6 0.439 9251 
61 SEYCHELLES SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA UMC - - - - - - 
62 SIERRA LEONE SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LIC 0.489 81.5 60.0 11.1 0.439 4321 
63 SOLOMON ISLAND PACIFIC MELANESIA OCEANIA LIC - - - - - - 
64 SOMALIA SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIC 0.514 81.2 63.3 9.5 0.514 6940 
65 SUDAN SUBSAHARAN NORTH AFRICA LMC - - - - - - 
66 SURINAME CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN AMERICA UMC 0.044 7.5 58.8 5.2 0..039 41 
67 SWAZILAND SUBSAHARAN SOUTHERN AFRICA LMC 0.183 41.1 44.4 24.5 0.086 231 
68 TANZANIA SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIC 0.367 65.3 56.3 23.0 0.332 29416 
69 TIMOR LESTE PACIFIC OCEANIA  - - - - 0.360 749 
70 TOGO SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LIC 0.284 54.3 52.4 21.6 0.284 3003 
71 TONGA PACIFIC POLYNESIA OCEANIA LMC - - - - - - 
72 TRINIDAD AND 
TOBAGO 
CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN AMERICA HIC - - - - 0.020 74 
73 TUVALU PACIFIC POLYNESIA OCEANIA LMC - - - - - - 
74 UGANDA SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIV - - - - 0.367 20530 
75 VANUATU PACIFIC MELANESIA OCEANIA LMC - - - - 0.129 67 
76 ZAMBIA SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIC 0.325 63.7 51.1 17.8 0.328 7739 
77 ZIMBABWE SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIC 0.174 38.5 45.2 24.6 0.172 4915 
78 OECD REGIONAL INTERNATIONAL HIC - - - - - - 
79 NON-OECD REGIONAL INTERNATIONAL HIC - - - - - - 
80 SSA REGIONAL INTERNATIONAL LIC - - - - - - 
81 LDC REGIONAL INTERNATIONAL LIC - - - - - - 
82 WORLD GLOBAL WORLDWIDE HIC/LIC - - - - - - 
NOTE: LMC   = Low Middle Income Country 
UMC   = Upper Middle Income Country 
HIC   = High-Income Country 
LIC   = Low-Income Country 
SSA   = SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
LDC   = LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
OECD   = ORGANIZATION OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND 
    DEVELOPMENT 
Income Status                    = Economies are divided among income groups according to 2009 GNI per capita 
(calculated using World bank Atlas Method) 
LIC Group  = US $395 
LMC Group  = US $996 – 3945 
UMC Group  = US $3946 – 12,195 
HIC Group  = US $12, 196 > 
 
SUBSAHARAN COUNTRIES = 47 

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PACIFIC COUNTRIES  = 15 
CARRIBEAN COUNTRIES = 15 
 
Operationally, the MPI is the product of the multidimensional poverty headcount (the 
share of people who are multidimensional poor) as well as the average number of 
deprivations that each multidimensional poor household experiences (i.e. the intensity 
of their poverty). Basically, it has three dimensions mirroring the HDI (Health, education 
and living standards) which are reflected in ten indicators (assets, floor, electricity, 
water, toilet, cooking fuel, children enrolled, years of schooling, child mortality and 
nutrition) each with equal weight within its dimension. Thus, a household is 
multidimensional poor if it is deprived in at least two to six indicators. As shown in table 
3.1 and immediately apparent, is that the MPI is most appropriate for less developed 
countries. Clearly, it captures the widespread deprivations in the sub-Saharan Africa, 
Pacific Oceania as well as the poorest Caribbean American countries. In fact, it reveals 
the magnitude of poverty beyond monetary measures (which is an important 
accomplishment). In other words, it helps capture and vividly convey overlapping 
deprivations (building on international consensus, captured in the MDGs, about the 
dimensions of serious and unacceptable disadvantage). 
 
Empirically, the MPI identifies multiple deprivations at the individual level in health, 
education and standard of living. It uses micro data from household surveys and each 
person in a given household is classified as poor or non poor depending on the number 
of deprivations, his or her household experiences. Then, these data are aggregated into 
national measure of poverty. Here, each person is assigned a score relative to his or 
her household’s deprivations in each of the ten component indicators (d) and the 
maximum score is ten (with each dimension equally weighted). The health and 
education dimensions have two indicators each while the standard of living dimension 
has six indicators. 
 
To identify the multidimensional poor, the deprivation score for each household are 
summed to obtain the household deprivation (c). Statistically, the MPI value is the 
product of two measures: multidimensional headcount ration and the intensity (or 
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breadth) of poverty. The headcount ration (H) is the proportion of the population who 
are multidimensional poor: 
 
5 6 7      (3.1) 
 
Where “q” is the number of people who are multidimensional poor while “n” is the total 
population. Here, the intensity of poverty (A) reflects the proportion of the weighted 
component indicators (d) in which (on average) poor people are deprived. For poor 
households only, the deprivation scores are summed and divided by the total number of 
indicators as well as total number of poor persons: 
 
$ 6 	8 77      (3.2) 
Where “c” is the total number of weighted deprivations that the poor will experience 
and “d” is the total number of component indicators considered. Therefore, the basic 
intuition is that the MPI represent the share of the population that is multidimensional 
poor (adjusted by the intensity of the deprivations suffered). 
 
Essentially, MPI is a new measure designed to capture the severe deprivations that 
each person faces at the same time. It reflects both the incidence of multidimensional 
deprivation and its intensity (i.e. how many deprivations people experience at the same 
time). Surely, it can be used to create a comprehensive picture of people living in 
poverty and permits comparisons across countries and regions of the world as currently 
being studied. Notably, the human poverty index (HPI) uses country averages to reflect 
aggregate deprivations in health, education and standard of living. Again, HPI could not 
identify specific individuals’ households or larger groups of people as jointly deprived. In 
contrast, the MPI captures how many people experience overlapping deprivations 
(incidence) and how many deprivations faced on average intensity. Critically, MPI value 
summaries information on multiple deprivations into a single number and it is calculated 
by multiplying the incidence of poverty by the average intensity of poverty. In other 
words, a person is identified as multidimensional poor, if he or she is one third or more 
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of ten (weighted) indicators. Thus, the MPI of a country or region is the product of the 
proportion of poor people (H) and the average share of deprivations that poor people 
face at the same time. That is, the average intensity of their poverty (A). In other words, 
MPI (H) multiplied by (A). By directly measuring the different types of poverty in each 
household, the MPI captures how people experience different deprivations 
simultaneously. 
 
Indeed, the ability of the MPI to reveal inequalities at a regional level as well as between 
social groups makes it a vital tool for policy makers. In fact, the global MPI allows us to 
compare people’s poverty and see the eradication of acute multidimensional poverty. 
Consequently, as reported, if progress continues at the same rate, current generations 
may see the eradication of acute multidimensional poverty in Africa, Caribbean and 
Pacific countries. However, the picture in some of these ACP countries looks much less 
positive. Notably, at the current rate of reduction, it will take decades for some of these 
ACP countries to halve multidimensional poverty. Again, based on the reported 
assumptions and estimates, it will take even several years to eradicate poverty as 
measured by the MPI in developing regions. Yet, these measures will help spur the 
eradication of multidimensional poverty in ACP countries (as investigated). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.0 REGIONAL HUNGER: ACP EXPERIENCE 
 
Since the early 1990s, the world has made some progress in reducing hunger. If the 
recent showdown can be reversed, the millennium development Goal (MGD) target of 
halving the share of Hungry people in the world (between 1990 and 2015) may be within 
reach. Regrettably (in 1990 – 1992) about one billion people went hungry and as at 
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today, about eight hundred and seventy million still suffer from hunger (IFPRI, 2013). 
Notably, many of the shocks and stresses to which poor and hungry people are 
exposed are caused by the actions of more affluent regions and countries. Therefore, 
as long as people go hungry, the fight against hunger must continue. Conceptually, 
hunger is usually understood to refer to the discomfort associated with lack of food. 
Here, FAO (2012) defines food deprivation or undernourishment as the consumption of 
fewer than about 1,800 kilocalories a day which is the minimum that most people 
require to live a healthy and productive life. 
 
In contrast, under-nutrition goes beyond calories and signifies deficiencies in any or all 
of the following: energy, protein, or essential vitamins and minerals. In other words, 
under-nutrition is the result of inadequate intake of food (in terms of either quantity or 
quality); poor utilization of nutrients due to infections or any other illness or a 
combination of these factors. In turn, these are caused by household food insecurity; 
inadequate maternal health or child care practices; or inadequate access to health 
services, safe water and sanitation. More broadly, malnutrition refers to both under-
nutrition (problem of deficiencies) and over-nutrition (problems of unbalanced diets). 
 
Essentially, a country’s Global Hunger Index (GHI) is calculated by averaging the 
percentage of the population that is undernourished, the percentage of children younger 
than five years that are underweight as well as percentage of children dying before the 
age of five. Clearly, this calculation will result in a 100 point scale on which zero is the 
best score (no hunger) while 100 is the worst score (hunger). Here, a value of 100 will 
be reached only if all children died before their fifth birthday and the whole population 
was undernourished. On the other hand, a value of zero would mean that a country had 
no undernourished people in the population and no children younger than five were 
overweight or no children who died before their fifth birthday. For the severity of hunger, 
the following scale applies: 
 
0 ≤ 4.9 => Low 
5.0 - 9.9 => Moderate 
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10.0 – 19.9 => Serious 
20.0 – 29.9 => Alarming 
30.0 – 100 => Extremely alarming 
 
Table 4.1 shows the panel scores of GHI for the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
countries. Although, Africa south of the Sahara made less progress in 1990s, it has 
caught up since the turn of the millennium and surpassed it with a 2013 GHI score that 
fell below expectation. Notably, the Africa south of Sahara’s GHI score increased 
marginally between 1990 and 1995 (fell slightly until 2000) and declined more sharply 
thereafter until the period reflected in 2013 GHI score. However, the large-scale civil 
wars of the 1990s and 2000 ended while countries earlier beset by conflict became 
more politically stable. Thus, economic growth resumed on the continent while 
advances in the fight against HIV and AIDS contributed to a reduction in child mortality 
in the countries mostly affected by the epidemic. Fortunately, mortality rates for children 
under age five have declined in Africa south of the Sahara since 2000. Here, a key 
factor behind the improved rates seems to be the decrease in the prevalence of malaria 
which coincided with the increased use of insecticide treated bed nets and other anti-
malarial interventions (Demombynes and Trommierova, 2007). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4.1 COMPARATIVE NATIONAL HUNGER INDEX: ACP COUNTRIES DATA 
 
 
A B C D E F G H I J 
S/N COUNTRIES REGION SUB REGION INCOME 
STATUS 
GHI: 
1990 
GHI: 
1995 GHI 
:2000 
GHI: 
2005 
GHI:2013 
1 ANGOLA SUBSAHARAN CENTRAL AFRICA LMC 39.5 38.5 31.6 22.7 19.1 
2 ANTIGUA AND CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN UMC - - - - - 
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BARBUDA AMERICA 
3 BAHAMAS, THE CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN 
AMERICA 
HIC - - - - - 
4 BARBADOS CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN 
AMERICA 
HIC - - - - - 
5 BELIZE CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN 
AMERICA 
LMC - - - - - 
6 BENIN SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LIC 22.5 20.5 17.3 15.2 13.3 
7 BOTSWANA SUBSAHARAN SOUTHERN 
AFRICA 
UMC 16.8 17.0 17.8 16.3 13.9 
8 BURKINA FASO SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LIC 26.9 22.7 26.1 26.6 22.2 
9 BURUNDI SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIC 33.8 38.1 39.5 39.5 38.8 
10 CAMEROON SUBSAHARAN CENTRAL AFRICA LMC 23.7 23.8 20.3 16.3 14.5 
11 CAPE VERDE SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LMC - - - - - 
12 CENTRAL 
AFRICAN 
REPUBLIC 
SUBSAHARAN CENTRAL AFRICA LIC 30.7 29.4 28.0 28.5 23.3 
13 CHAD SUBSAHARAN CENTRAL AFRICA LIC 38.8 34.9 29.8 29.7 26.9 
14 COMOROS SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIC 24.0 27.5 33.3 29.8 33.6 
15 DEM. REP OF 
CONGO 
SUBSAHARAN CENTRAL AFRICA LIC 23.7 23.9 19.3 18.4 20.5 
16 CONGO SUBSAHARAN CENTRAL AFRICA LMC - - - - - 
17 COOK ISLANDS PACIFIC POLYNESIA 
OCEANIA 
- - - - - - 
18 COTE D’IVOIRE SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LMC 16.3 16.5 17.3 16.4 16.1 
19 DJIBOUTI SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LMC 33.5 28.5 27.7 24.0 19.5 
20 DOMINICA CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN 
AMERICA 
UMC - - - - - 
21 DOMINICAN 
REPUBLIC 
CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN 
AMERICA 
UMC 14.9 11.7 9.7 8.8 7.0 
22 EQUATORIAL 
GUNINEA 
SUBSAHARAN CENTRAL AFRICA LIC - - - - - 
23 ERITREA SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIC - 40.6 40.2 39.3 35.0 
24 ETHIOPIA SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIC 42.3 42.7 37.1 31.0 25.7 
25 FIJI PACIFIC MELANESIA 
OCEANIA 
UMC - - - - - 
26 GABON SUBSAHARAN CENTRAL AFRICA UMC 9.7 8.0 7.8 6.9 7.2 
27 GAMBIA SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LIC 19.1 20.4 16.1 15.6 14.0 
28 GHANA SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LIC 25.5 19.6 15.6 10.7 8.2 
29 GRENADA CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN 
AMERICA 
UMC - - - - - 
30 GUINEA SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LIC 21.4 21.2 22.4 18.2 16.9 
31 GUINEA-
BISSAU 
SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LIC 21.7 20.8 20.6 17.7 14.3 
A B C D E F G H I J 
S/N COUNTRIES REGION SUB REGION INCOME 
STATUS 
GHI: 
1990 
GHI: 
1995 
 
GHI 
:2000 
GHI: 
2005 
GHI:2013 
32 GUYANA CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN 
AMERICA 
LMC 14.3 10.2 8.2 8.0 6.6 
33 HAITI CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN 
AMERICA 
LIC 33.8 31.7 25.7 27.0 23.3 
34 JAMAICA CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN 
AMERICA 
UMC - - - - - 
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35 KENYA SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIC 21.4 21.0 20.5 20.2 18.0 
36 KIRIBATI PACIFIC MICRONESIA 
OCEANIA 
LMC - - - - - 
37 LESOTHO SUBSAHARAN SOUTHERN 
AFRICA 
LMC 13.2 14.6 14.6 14.9 12.9 
38 LIBERIA SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LIC 23.4 28.2 24.7 20.6 17.9 
39 MADAGASCAR SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIC - - - - - 
40 MALAWI SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIC 30.6 27.6 21.6 18.7 15.1 
41 MALI SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LIC 27.4 26.9 24.3 20.7 14.8 
42 MARSHALL 
ISLANDS 
PACIFIC MICRONESIA 
OCEANIA 
LMC - - - - - 
43 MAURITANIA SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LIC - - - - - 
44 MAURITIUS SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA UMC 8.5 7.6 6.5 5.9 5.2 
45 MICRONESIA FED. 
STATES 
PACIFIC MICRONESIA 
OCEANIA 
LMC - - - - - 
46 MOZAMBIQUE SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIC 36.0 32.0 28.5 25.1 21.5 
47 NAMIBIA SUBSAHARAN SOUTHERN 
AFRICA 
UMC 22.1 21.9 17.5 17.1 18.4 
48 NAURU PACIFIC MICRONESIA 
OCEANIA 
- - - - - - 
49 NIGER SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LIC 36.4 34.6 30.3 25.6 20.3 
50 NIGERIA SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LMC 25.3 22.6 17.9 16.3 15.0 
51 NILE PACIFIC POLYNESIA 
OCEANIA 
- - - - - - 
52 PALAU PACIFIC MICRONESIA 
OCEANIA 
UMC - - - - - 
53 PAPUA NEW 
GUINEA 
PACIFIC MELANESIA 
OCEANIA 
LMC - - - - - 
54 RWANDA SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIC 30.8 37.3 29.0 23.6 15.3 
55 SAINT KITTS/NEVIS CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN 
AMERICA 
UMC - - - - - 
56 SAINT LUCIA CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN 
AMERICA 
UMC - - - - - 
57 SAINT VINCENT/ 
GRENADINES 
CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN 
AMERICA 
UMC - - - - - 
58 SAMAO PACIFIC POLYNESIA 
OCEANIA 
LMC - - - - - 
59 SAOTOME/PRINCI
PE 
SUBSAHARAN CENTRAL AFRICA LMC - - - - - 
60 SENEGAL SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LMC 18.1 19.8 19.2 3.7 13.8 
61 SEYCHELLES SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA UMC - - - - - 
62 SIERRA LEONE SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LIC 
 
31.3 29.5 30.0 28.4 22.8 
A B C D E F G H I J 
S/N COUNTRIES REGION SUB REGION INCOME 
STATUS 
GHI: 
1990 
GHI: 
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GHI 
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GHI: 
2005 
GHI:2013 
63 SOLOMON ISLAND PACIFIC MELANESIA 
OCEANIA 
LIC - - - - - 
64 SOMALIA SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIC - - - - - 
65 SUDAN SUBSAHARAN NORTH AFRICA LMC 31.1 25.7 27.2 24.7 27.0 
66 SURINAME CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN 
AMERICA 
UMC 11.3 9.9 11.1 8.9 6.7 


67 SWAZILAND SUBSAHARAN SOUTHERN 
AFRICA 
LMC 10.4 12.9 12.7 12.5 14.4 
68 TANZANIA SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIC 23.4 26.9 26.1 20.5 20.6 
69 TIMOR LESTE PACIFIC OCEANIA  - - - 26.0 29.6 
70 TOGO SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LIC 23.0 19.1 20.4 18.2 14.7 
71 TONGA PACIFIC POLYNESIA 
OCEANIA 
LMC - - - - - 
72 TRINIDAD AND 
TOBAGO 
CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN 
AMERICA 
HIC - - - - - 
73 TUVALU PACIFIC POLYNESIA 
OCEANIA 
LMC - - - - - 
74 UGANDA SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIV 21.4 22.9 19.9 18.6 19.2 
75 VANUATU PACIFIC MELANESIA 
OCEANIA 
LMC - - - - - 
76 ZAMBIA SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIC 24.9 24.5 26.3 25.3 24.1 
77 ZIMBABWE SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIC 20.0 22.0 21.7 20.5 10.5 
78 OECD REGIONAL INTERNATIONAL HIC - - - - - 
79 NON-OECD REGIONAL INTERNATIONAL HIC - - - - - 
80 SSA REGIONAL INTERNATIONAL LIC - - - - - 
81 LDC REGIONAL INTERNATIONAL LIC - - - - - 
82 WORLD GLOBAL WORLDWIDE HIC/LIC - - - - - 
NOTE: LMC   = Low Middle Income Country 
UMC   = Upper Middle Income Country 
HIC   = High-Income Country 
LIC   = Low-Income Country 
SSA   = SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
LDC   = LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
OECD   = ORGANIZATION OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND 
    DEVELOPMENT 
Income Status                    = Economies are divided among income groups according to 2009 GNI per capita 
(calculated using World bank Atlas Method) 
LIC Group  = US $395 < 
LMC Group  = US $996 – 3945 
UMC Group  = US $3946 – 12,195 
HIC Group  = US $12, 196 > 
 
SUBSAHARAN COUNTRIES = 47 
PACIFIC COUNTRIES  = 15 
CARRIBEAN COUNTRIES = 15 
 
Again, other factors that may have helped cut mortality rates include higher 
immunization rates as well as greater share of births in medical centre. Others include 
improved antenatal care and access to clean water and sanitation facilities as well as 
increasing levels of income leading to better nutrition (and medical care access). 
However, the situation remains fragile in 2013 despite a good harvest. Yet, recurrent 
crisis in recent years (combination of sporadic rainfall, locust infestation, crop shortages, 
high and volatile food prices) have negatively affected food and nutrition security in the 
region, eroded the coping capacity of already vulnerable groups and weakened their 
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resilience to shocks. Specifically, the conflict in northern Nigeria as well as migration 
pressure clearly exacerbated the situation. Therefore, addressing the root causes of the 
recurrent crises is highly imperative for hunger eradication and food security in Africa, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. 
 
In fact, in five countries, GHI scores have risen since 1990. Here, the three worst 
performers are located in Africa South of the Sahara. The increased hunger (since 
1990) in Burundi and Comoros can be attributed to prolonged conflict and political 
instability. In Comoros, the GHI score fell (after peaking in 2000) but climbed up again 
since 2005. Between 1999 and 2000, Burundi’s GHI score rose and remained at a very 
high level until 2005. With the transition to peace and political stability (as at 2003) the 
country began a slow recovery from decades of economic decline. However, its high 
level of undernourishment remains a serious one. Regrettably, the proportion of 
undernourished people has continued to rise since 1990 and remains one of the highest 
in Africa. The time for action is now so as to reverse the ugly trend. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.0 PRODUCTIVE SUSTAINABILITY: ACP EXPERIENCE 
 
Indeed, the global financial crisis and the ensuing developments have heightened the 
role of developing and emerging economies in the global context. Although the global 
economy prospects are (today) more positive than they were in the past; growth has 
begin to show across many African, Caribbean and Pacific economies and elsewhere 
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continue to struggle. Therefore, it is worthwhile to understand some of the key factors 
that determine economic growth; helps to explain why some countries are more 
successful than others in raising income levels and providing opportunities for their 
respective populations; as well as offering important tools to policy makers and 
business leaders. And critical challenges remain: policy makers around the globe need 
to ensure that public finances are sustainable in the longer term, where the pains of 
deleveraging will be particularly felt by developed economies. However, unemployment 
or the threat of it remains one of the main challenges to long-term social sustainability. 
Basically, a country’s competitiveness is widely accepted as the key driver for 
sustaining prosperity and raising the wellbeing of its citizens. In fact, enhancing 
competitiveness is a long term process that requires improvement across many areas 
as well as long lasting commitments from relevant stakeholders to mobilize resources, 
time, and effort. Thus, to make the right decisions, these stakeholders need information 
and data (WEF, 2013). 
 
Conceptually, competitiveness can be defined as the set of institutions, policies and 
factors that determine the level of productivity of a country. In turn, the level of 
productivity sets the level of prosperity that can be reached by an economy. Here, the 
productivity level also determines the rates of return obtained by investments in an 
economy (which are the fundamental drivers of its growth rates). In other words, a more 
competitive economy is the one that is likely to grow faster overtime. Thus, the concept 
of competitiveness involves static and dynamic components. Although the productivity 
of a country determines its ability to sustain a high level of income; it is equally one of 
the determinants of its returns on investment (which is one of the key factors explaining 
an economy’s growth potentials). Operationally, many determinants drive productivity 
and competitiveness. Yet, understanding the factors behind this process has occupied 
the minds of economists for several centuries. While all of these neoclassical factors are 
likely to be important for competitiveness and growth, they may not be mutually 
exclusive. Consequently, this open-endedness is captured within the global 
competitiveness index (GCI) by including a weighted average of many different 
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components (with each measuring a different aspect of competitiveness). Therefore, 
these components are grouped into twelve pillars of competitiveness.  
 
As the first pillar, institutional environment is determined by the legal and administrative 
framework within which individuals, firms and governments interact to generate wealth. 
Here, the quality of institutions has a strong bearing on competitiveness and growth. It 
influences investment decisions (and organization of production) and plays a key role in 
the ways in which societies distribute the benefits as well as bearing the costs of 
development strategies (and policies). Obviously, the role of institutions goes beyond 
the legal framework. In other words, government attitudes toward markets and 
freedoms as well as the efficiency of its operations are equally important. Notably, 
excessive bureaucracy and red tapism; over regulation; corruption; dishonesty in 
dealing with public contracts; lack of transparency and trustworthiness; inability to 
provide appropriate services for the business sector as well as political dependence of 
the judicial system impose significant economic costs to businesses while slowing the 
process of economic developments. 
  
Secondly, the extensive and efficient infrastructure is critical for ensuring the effective 
functioning of the economy. As an important factor, it determines the location of 
economic activity as well as the kinds of activities or sectors that can develop within a 
country. Operationally, effective modes of transport (including quality roads, railroads, 
ports and air transport) enable entrepreneurs to get their goods and services to market 
in a secure and timely manner. It also facilitates the movement of workers to the most 
suitable jobs. As the third pillar, macroeconomic environment is important for business 
and also significant for the overall competitiveness of a country. In contrast, 
macroeconomic disarray harms the economy since the government cannot provide 
services efficiently (if it has to make high-interest payments on the past debts). 
However, it is important to note that this pillar only evaluates the stability of the 
macroeconomic environment of any given nation. 
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The fourth pillar is Health and Primary Education. Thus, a healthy workforce is vital to a 
country’s competitiveness and productivity. Essentially, this pillar takes into account the 
quantity and quality of the basic education received by the population (which is 
increasingly important in today’s economy). In fact, lack of basic education can become 
a constraint on business development, with firms finding it very difficult to move up to 
the \value chain (by producing more sophisticated-value intensive products). As the fifth 
pillar, higher education and Training is crucial for economies that want to move up the 
value chain that is beyond simple production processes and products. Basically, the 
pillar measures secondary and tertiary enrollment rates as well as the quality of 
education as evaluated by business leaders. Similarly, the extent of staff training is 
equally taken into consideration because of the importance of vocational/continuous on-
the job training for ensuring a constant upgrading of workers’ skills. Goods market 
efficiency is the sixth pillar. Thus, countries with efficient goods markets are well 
positioned to produce the right mix of products and services given their particular supply 
and demand conditions as well as to ensure that these goods can be most effectively 
traded in the economy. It also depends on demand conditions such as customer 
orientation and buyer sophistication. Clearly, this can create an important competitive 
advantage as it forces companies to be more innovative as well as customer-oriented 
and therefore imposes the discipline necessary for efficiency to be achieved in the 
market. The seventh pillar is labor market efficiency. Here, the efficiency and flexibility 
of the labor market are very critical for ensuring that workers are allocated to their most 
effective use in the economy and provided with incentives to give their best effort in their 
jobs. Again, efficient labor markets must also ensure clear strong incentive for 
employees as well as efforts to promote meritocracy at the workplace.  
 
Financial Market development is the eight pillar. As an efficient sector, it allocates the 
resources saved by a nation’s citizens, as well as those entering the economy from 
abroad, to their most productive uses. In other words, it channels resources to those 
investment projects with the highest expected rate of return. Therefore, a thorough and 
proper assessment of risk is a key ingredient of a sound financial market. Again, the 
ninth pillar is Technological Readiness.  Here, whether the technology used has or has 
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not been developed within national borders is irrelevant for its ability to enhance 
productivity. Yet, the central point is that firms operating in the country need to have 
access to advanced products and blueprints as well as the ability to absorb and use 
them. Thus, among the main sources of foreign technology, foreign direct investment 
plays a key role. 
As the tenth pillar, the size of the market affects productivity since large markets allow 
firms to exploit economies of scale. By including both domestic and foreign markets in 
the measure of market size, credit should be given to export-driven economies and 
geographic areas that are divided into many countries but have a single common 
market. The eleventh pillar is Business Sophistication while Innovation is the twelfth 
pillar. Operationally, Business Sophistication concerns two elements that are intricately 
linked: quality of a country’s overall business networks as well as the quality of 
individual firms’ operations and strategies. Unlike these other factors, in the long run, 
standards of living can be largely enhanced by technological innovation. Notably, 
technological breakthroughs have been at the basis of many of the productivity gains 
that our economies have historically experienced. Critically, firms in developing 
countries are expected to design and develop cutting-edge products as well as 
processes to maintain a competitive edge while moving toward higher value-added 
activities. However, this progression requires an environment that is conducive to 
innovative activity and supported by both the public (private) sectors. 
 
As shown in figure 5.1, the above twelve pillars of competitiveness are not independent 
(WEF, 2013). Here, they tend to reinforce each other, while a weakness in one area 
tends to have negative impact in others. Indeed, while all of the twelve pillars will matter 
to a certain extent for all economies, it is clear that they will affect them in different 
ways. This is because of the fact that different countries are in different stages of 
development. Clearly, as countries move along the development path, wages tend to 
increase; and to be able to sustain the higher income, labor productivity must improve. 
Following the traditional-theory of stages of development, the GCI framework assumes 
that (in the first stage) the economy is factor-driven and countries compete based on 
their factor endowments (primarily unskilled labor and natural resources). Here, 
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companies compete on the basis of price and sell basic products or commodities with 
their low productivity reflected in low wages. Here maintaining competitiveness at this 
stage of development hinges primarily on pillar one; pillar two, pillar three, and pillar 
four. 
 
Again, as a country becomes more competitive, productivity will increase while wages 
will rise with advancing development. Countries will therefore move into the efficiency-
driven stage of development. Here, they must begin to develop more efficient 
production processes and increase product quality. At this point, competitiveness is 
increasingly driven by pillar five, pillar six, pillar seven, pillar eight, pillar nine, and pillar 
ten. In contrast, as countries move into the innovation-driven stage, wages will have 
risen by so much that they are able to sustain those higher wages and the associated 
standard of living only if their businesses are able to compete with new and unique 
products. Again, at this stage, companies must compete by producing new and different 
goods using the most sophisticated production processes (pillar eleven) as well as by 
innovating new ones (pillar twelve). Operationally, the global competitiveness index 
(GCI) takes the stages of development into account by attributing higher relative 
weights to those pillars that are more relevant for an economy given its particular stage 
of development. Table 5.1 shows the various GCI for the ACP countries as being 
investigated. Although sub-Saharan Africa continues its impressive growth rate, there 
are some regional variations. Notably, growth has largely taken place on the backs of 
strong investment, favorable commodity prices and prudent macroeconomic stance. In 
terms of underlying competitiveness, sub-Saharan Africa continues to reflect one of the 
significant regional variations in the GCI. Generally, sub-Saharan Africa as a whole 
trails the rest of the world in competitiveness, requiring efforts across many areas to 
place the region on a firmly sustainable growth and development path going forward. 
Regrettably, the region continues to register a profound infrastructure deficit. Moreover, 
the region continues to underperform significantly in providing health and basic 
education. Notably, the region’s poor performance across all basic requirements for 
competitiveness stands in stark contrast to its comparatively stronger performance in 
market efficiency, (where particularly the region’s middle-income economies fare 
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relatively well). Moving forward, technological uptake continues to remain weak, with 
only three economies featuring in the top half of the overall GCI rankings on this pillar 
(WEF, 2013). Specifically, Nigeria is ranked 120th and the country continues to benefit 
from its relatively large market size, which has the potential for significant economies of 
scale as well as being an important factor for attracting investment. Averagely, Nigeria 
may be benefiting from a large labor market as well as improved financial market. Yet, 
efforts need to be taken to diversify its economy into the non-oil sector and increase 
long-term competitiveness 
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TABLE 5.1 COMPARATIVE (SUSTAINABILITY ADJUSTED) GCI INDEX: ACP 
COUNTRIES DATA. 
 

A B C D E F G H I J 
S/N COUNTRIES REGION SUB  
REGION 
INCOME  
STATUS 
GCI: RANK (OUT 
OF 148)  
2013-2014 
GCI: SCORE 
 (1-7)  
2013-2014 
 
GCI :RANK (OUT 
OF 148) 2012-2013 
SUSTAINABILITY 
ADJUSTED GCI 
2013/14 SCORE 
DIRECTIONAL 
CHANGE (+) (-) 
1 ANGOLA SUBSAHARAN CENTRAL AFRICA LMC 142 3.15 -   
2 ANTIGUA AND 
BARBUDA 
CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN 
AMERICA 
UMC - - -   
3 BAHAMAS, THE CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN 
AMERICA 
HIC - - -   
4 BARBADOS CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN 
AMERICA 
HIC 47 4.42 47   
5 BELIZE CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN 
AMERICA 
LMC - - -   
6 BENIN SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LIC 130 3.45 127 3.19 - 
7 BOTSWANA SUBSAHARAN SOUTHERN AFRICA UMC 74 4.13 74 3.99 + - 
8 BURKINA FASO SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LIC 140 3.21 136   
9 BURUNDI SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIC 146 2.92 141   
10 CAMEROON SUBSAHARAN CENTRAL AFRICA LMC 115 3.68 112 3.47 - 
11 CAPE VERDE SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LMC 122 3.53 119 3.15 - 
12 CENTRAL 
AFRICAN 
REPUBLIC 
SUBSAHARAN CENTRAL AFRICA LIC - - -   
13 CHAD SUBSAHARAN CENTRAL AFRICA LIC 148 2.85 143   
14 COMOROS SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIC - - -   
15 DEM. REP OF 
CONGO 
SUBSAHARAN CENTRAL AFRICA LIC - - -   
16 CONGO SUBSAHARAN CENTRAL AFRICA LMC - - -   
17 COOK ISLANDS PACIFIC POLYNESIA 
OCEANIA 
- - - -   
18 COTE D’IVOIRE SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LMC 126 3.50 123 3.25 - 
19 DJIBOUTI SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LMC - - -   
20 DOMINICA CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN 
AMERICA 
UMC - - -   
21 DOMINICAN 
REPUBLIC 
CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN 
AMERICA 
UMC 105 3.76 103 3.40 - 
22 EQUATORIAL 
GUNINEA 
SUBSAHARAN CENTRAL AFRICA LIC - - -   
23 ERITREA SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIC - - -   
24 ETHIOPIA SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIC 127 3.50 124 3.20 - 
25 FIJI PACIFIC MELANESIA 
OCEANIA 
UMC - - -   
26 GABON SUBSAHARAN CENTRAL AFRICA UMC 112 3.70 109 3.62 + - 
27 GAMBIA SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LIC 116 3.67 113 3.47 - 
28 GHANA SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LIC 114 3.69 111 3.48 - 
29 GRENADA CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN 
AMERICA 
UMC - - - - - 
30 GUINEA SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LIC 147 2.91 142   
31 GUINEA-BISSAU SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LIC - - -   
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A B C D E F G H I J 
 
S/N COUNTRIES REGION SUB  
REGION 
INCOME  
STATUS 
GCI: RANK (OUT 
OF 148)  
2013-2014 
GCI: SCORE 
 (1-7)  
2013-2014 
 
GCI :RANK (OUT 
OF 148) 2012-2013 
SUSTAINABILITY 
ADJUSTED GCI 
2013/14 SCORE 
DIRECTIONAL 
CHANGE (+) (-) 
 
 
32 GUYANA CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN 
AMERICA 
LMC 102 3.77 100 3.54 - 
33 HAITI CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN 
AMERICA 
LIC 143 3.11 138 2.63 - 
34 JAMAICA CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN 
AMERICA 
UMC 94 3.86 92 3.67 -  - 
35 KENYA SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIC 96 3.85 94 3.63 +  - 
36 KIRIBATI PACIFIC MICRONESIA 
OCEANIA 
LMC - - - - - 
37 LESOTHO SUBSAHARAN SOUTHERN AFRICA LMC 123 3.52 120 - - 
38 LIBERIA SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LIC 128 3.45 125 3.22 - 
39 MADAGASCAR SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIC 132 3.42 129 3.00 - 
40 MALAWI SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIC 136 3.32 133 - - 
41 MALI SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LIC 135 3.33 132 - - 
42 MARSHALL 
ISLANDS 
PACIFIC MICRONESIA 
OCEANIA 
LMC - - - - - 
43 MAURITANIA SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LIC 141 3.19 137 2.63 - 
44 MAURITIUS SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA UMC - - - - - 
45 MICRONESIA FED. 
STATES 
PACIFIC MICRONESIA 
OCEANIA 
LMC - - - - - 
46 MOZAMBIQUE SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIC 137 3.30 134 3.09 - 
47 NAMIBIA SUBSAHARAN SOUTHERN AFRICA UMC 90 3.93 88 3.72 +  - 
48 NAURU PACIFIC MICRONESIA 
OCEANIA 
- - - - - - 
49 NIGER SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LIC - - - - - 
50 NIGERIA SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LMC 120 3.57 117 3.34 - 
51 NILE PACIFIC POLYNESIA 
OCEANIA 
- - - - - - 
52 PALAU PACIFIC MICRONESIA 
OCEANIA 
UMC - - - - - 
53 PAPUA NEW 
GUINEA 
PACIFIC MELANESIA 
OCEANIA 
LMC - - - - - 
54 RWANDA SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIC 66 4.21 66 - - 
55 SAINT 
KITTS/NEVIS 
CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN 
AMERICA 
UMC - - - - - 
56 SAINT LUCIA CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN 
AMERICA 
UMC - - - - - 
57 SAINT VINCENT/ 
GRENADINES 
CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN 
AMERICA 
UMC - - - - - 
58 SAMAO PACIFIC POLYNESIA 
OCEANIA 
LMC - - - - - 
59 SAOTOME/PRINCI
PE 
SUBSAHARAN CENTRAL AFRICA LMC - - - - - 
60 SENEGAL SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LMC 113 3.70 110 3.41 - 
61 SEYCHELLES SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA UMC 80 4.10 80 - - 
 
62 SIERRA LEONE SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LIC 
 
144 3.01 139 2.74 - 
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A B C D E F G H I J 
S/N COUNTRIES REGION SUB  
REGION 
INCOME  
STATUS 
GCI: RANK (OUT 
OF 148)  
2013-2014 
GCI: SCORE 
 (1-7)  
2013-2014 
 
GCI :RANK (OUT 
OF 148) 2012-2013 
SUSTAINABILITY 
ADJUSTED GCI 
2013/14 SCORE 
DIRECTIONAL 
CHANGE (+) (-) 
63 SOLOMON ISLAND PACIFIC MELANESIA 
OCEANIA 
LIC - - - - - 
64 SOMALIA SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIC - - - - - 
65 SUDAN SUBSAHARAN NORTH AFRICA LMC - - - - - 
66 SURINAME CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN 
AMERICA 
UMC 106 3.75 104 3.74 +  - 
67 SWAZILAND SUBSAHARAN SOUTHERN AFRICA LMC 124 3.52 121 3.30 - 
68 TANZANIA SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIC 125 3.50 122 3.27 - 
69 TIMOR LESTE PACIFIC OCEANIA  138 3.25 135 2.81 - 
70 TOGO SUBSAHARAN WEST AFRICA LIC - - - - - 
71 TONGA PACIFIC POLYNESIA 
OCEANIA 
LMC - - - - - 
72 TRINIDAD AND 
TOBAGO 
CARRIBEAN CARRIBEAN 
AMERICA 
HIC 92 3.91 90 3.89 +  - 
73 TUVALU PACIFIC POLYNESIA 
OCEANIA 
LMC - - - - - 
74 UGANDA SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIV 129 3.45 126 - - 
75 VANUATU PACIFIC MELANESIA 
OCEANIA 
LMC - - - - - 
76 ZAMBIA SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIC 93 3.86 91 3.70 +  - 
77 ZIMBABWE SUBSAHARAN EASTERN AFRICA LIC 131 3.44 128 3.19 - 
78 UNITED STATES AMERICA AMERICA HIC 5 5.58 5 5.52 +  - 
79 UNITED KINGDOM EUROPE EUROPE HIC 10 5.37 10 5.85 +  
80 AUSTRALIA OCEANIA OCEANIA HIC 21 5.09 21 5.50 + 
81 CHINA ASIA ASIA HIC 29 4.84 29 4.65 +  - 
NOTE:  LMC    = Low Middle Income Country 
UMC   = Upper Middle Income Country 
HIC   = High-Income Country 
LIC   = Low-Income Country 
SSA   = SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
LDC   = LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
OECD   = ORGANIZATION OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND 
     DEVELOPMENT 
Income Status                 = Economies are divided among income groups according to 2009 GNI 
per capita (calculated using World bank Atlas Method) 
LIC Group  = US $395 < 
LMC Group  = US $996 – 3945 
UMC Group  = US $3946 – 12,195 
HIC Group  = US $12, 196 > 
 
SUBSAHARAN COUNTRIES = 47 
PACIFIC COUNTRIES  = 15 
CARRIBEAN COUNTRIES = 15 
 
++ = GCI score changes by > 15% to 20% 
+ = GCI score changes by +5% to 15% 
+ - = GCI score remains stable between +5% and -5% 
-        = GCI score changes by 5% to – 15% 
- - = GCI score changes by <15% to – 20% 
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Unfortunately, institutions remain weak with insufficiently protected property rights, high 
corruption as well as undue influence. Again, the security situation in the country 
(already seriously worrisome) continues its downward trend. Consequently, Nigeria 
must continue to upgrade its infrastructure as well as improve health and primary 
education. In fact, the country is not harnessing the latest technologies for productivity 
enhancements as demonstrated by its low rates of ICT penetration. Indeed, the Global 
Competitiveness Index (GCI) aims to capture the complexity of the phenomenon of 
national competitiveness, which can be improved only through an array of efforts in 
different areas that affect the longer-term productivity of a country (which is the key 
factor affecting economic growth performance of economies). 
 
Basically, the concept of competitiveness aims at capturing the economic development 
process as a necessary condition for improved living standards. However, recent 
projections and studies have pointed out the rates of progress seen in the past may not 
be sustainable going forward. As income levels have risen and more and more 
emerging markets have entered rapid growth paths; pressures on the environment have 
become more palpable while concerns over the distribution of the benefits of economic 
progress within countries have grown. Consequently, many are forced to question 
whether the prevalent growth model is sustainable overtime. Despite mounting interest 
in sustainable development, the relationship between environmental (social) 
sustainability and national competitiveness has been marginally explored. In other 
words, little is known about how these aspects of sustainability relate to competitiveness 
and productivity. Taking into account all relevant aspects, it emerges that the 
relationship between environmental sustainability and competitiveness is multifaceted 
which affects an economy in different ways. Here, multiple channels support a positive 
relationship between environmentally sustainable practices and productivity gains. 
These factors can be identified and described as follows: efficient use of natural 
resources, improved health, and biodiversity for innovation. In addition to these general 
sources of potential competitiveness gains for an economy, environmental sustainability 
can have more marked impacts in particular economic sectors such as agriculture, 
fishery and forestry. On the other hand, we can analyze those dimensions of social 
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sustainability that are likely to fuel productivity as well as long-term prosperity while at 
the same time preserving social stability. Here, we can unbundle the most relevant 
elements (even if they are often interrelated): inclusion, equity and cohesion as well as 
resilience. 
 
Therefore, social sustainability can be defined as the institutions, policies and factors 
that enable all members of society to experience the best possible health, participation 
and security. In other words, it maximizes their potential to contribute to and benefit 
from the economic prosperity of the country in which they live. However, the quality of 
the environment and the structure of the society are strictly correlated. On one hand, 
well-managed natural resources increase the quality of life, reduce tensions within and 
between generations; provide better opportunities to the whole community as well as 
improving the resilience of the society. On the other hand, widespread prosperity which 
facilitates a high quality of life requires a functioning economy that (by definition) uses 
natural resources. Therefore, sustainable competitiveness can be defined as the set of 
institutions, policies and factors that make a nation remain productive over the longer 
term while ensuring social and environmental sustainability. Although competitiveness 
can be equated with productivity and economic performance; sustainable 
competiveness focuses on concepts that go beyond mere economic wellbeing to 
include other important elements that render societies sustainably prosperous by 
ensuring high-quality growth. In other words it aims to gauge not only whether a country 
has the potential to grow over the medium and long term; but whether the national 
development process is producing the kind of society in which we want to live. 
 
Based on the above definition, we can develop a framework that aims to create a 
common ground to develop policies that balance economic prosperity with social 
inclusion and environmental stewardship. Clearly, the conceptual model is represented 
in figure 5.2 (WEF, 2013). Essentially, this represents a framework where the forum’s 
index for measuring competitiveness (GCI) is adjusted by factors that encompass social 
and environmental sustainability. As previously indicated, the GCI is a comprehensive 
index that takes into account twelve pillars or drivers. However, the new framework as 
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presented indicated that competitiveness on its own may not lead to sustainable level of 
prosperity. Thus, while the attainment of a certain level of economic prosperity is 
essential for achieving high standards of living (within this exercise) countries are 
assessed also for their ability to generate the long-lasting prosperity for their citizens in 
a sustainable way. In other words, competitiveness is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for continued prosperity. Thus, there is need for social sustainability (adjusted) 
and environmental sustainability (adjusted) measures of competitiveness. However, the 
final overall sustainability-adjusted global competitiveness index is an average of the 
two sustainability-adjusted indexes: Social sustainability-adjusted GCI and 
environmental sustainability-adjusted GCI. For social sustainability, three conceptual 
elements can be identified: 
 
1. Access to basic necessities  (a) Access to Sanitation 
(b) Access to improved drinking water 
(c) Access to healthcare. 
 
2. Vulnerability to shocks   (a) Vulnerable employment 
       (b) Extent of informal economy 
       (c) Social safety net protection 
 
3. Social Cohesion   (a) Income Gini Index 
       (b) Social mobility 
       (c) Youth empowerment 
 
On the other hand, the indicators for environmental sustainability include: 
1. Environmental Policy (a) Environmental regulations     
(stringency    and enforcement) 
(b) Number of ratified international 
environmental treaties. 
(c) Terrestrial biome protection 
 
2. Use of Renewable Resources
3. Degradation of Environment
 
FIGURE 5.2  SUSTAINABILITY

As shown in table 5.1, Ghana’s sustainability assessment unveils particular pressures 
on the social sustainability pillar where (despite continued growth) access to improved 
SOCIAL SUSTAINABILITY PILLAR
SUSTAINABILITY 
ADJUSTED GCI 
(GCI) X (SOCIAL 
SUSTAINABILITY 

 (a) Agricultural water intensity
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sanitation is still very low and the development process has not yet benefited large 
portions of the population that have vulnerable jobs or work in the informal economy, 
whom do not have access to social security. As a result of this structure, income 
inequality is relatively high and on the rise (highlighting the non-inclusive economic 
growth in the country). Consequently, this could lead to social tensions in the longer 
term. Yet, the most important finding of this analysis is that there is no necessary trade-
off between being competitive and being sustainable. Generally, many countries at the 
top of the competitiveness rankings are also the best performers in many areas of 
sustainability. Subsequently, economies that are able to balance economic progress 
with social inclusion as well as good effective environmental stewardship will most likely 
experience higher rates of human progress and prosperity. Therefore, given the 
complexity of the issue at hand as well as important gaps in data to measure key 
elements of sustainable competitiveness, the desire to measure key elements of 
sustainable competitiveness should be designed as a continuous process. 
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6.0  REGIONAL FRAMEWORK ANALYSIS  
Essential, the World Bank linkage model is a recursive dynamic applied general 
equilibrium model. Its earlier versions were used to study global trade reform: 
Rural/Urban/North/South (RUNS) model as well as World Agricultural Liberation Study 
(WALRAS). Initially, both were integrated into separate research programs at the 
OECD. However, in the mid 1990s, WALRAS was transformed into the OECD GREEN 
model used to assess the impacts of green house gas mitigation. As at this time, model 
implementation used second generation programming languages (FORTRAN and C). 
Subsequently, there were improvements in software so that model development was 
done with third generation languages such as GAMS, GAUSS and GEMPACK. Yet, the 
second major advance was the creation of a unified global database known as Global 
Trade Analysis Program (GTAP) which created a consistent global data set for use in 
analyzing international economic policy issues. Against this background, the linkage 
model is a global, multi-region, multi-sector, dynamic applied general equilibrium model. 
It is currently implemented in GAMS and its specification is virtually free of references to 
specific dimensions (region, sector, or time). Thus, the model is accompanied by an 
aggregation facility, which is used to aggregate the extensive GTAP dataset into a 
tractable dataset for simulation purposes. Here, the output of the aggregation facility is 
the primary input for the model. Again, the aggregation facility also produces some 
auxiliary data (such as population) and the model user is expected to provide values for 
all key elasticities. On the other hand, the dynamic version of the model requires as 
series of assumptions which are to be provided independently of the aggregation facility 
(Van der Mensbrugghe, 2011). 
Notably, the growing availability of micro data sets( such as those from household 
surveys, labor force surveys, population censuses and community-level surveys) as well 
as progress in quantitative economic analysis have contributed to a renewed policy 
relevant interest on the mutual relationship between growth and distribution (Bussolo, 
et.al. 2010). 
Specifically the Global Income Distribution Dynamics (GIDD) model is a global C6E- 
micro simulation frame work that takes into account the macro nature of growth and 
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integrates a micro economic (individual and household) dimension. By including 121 
countries and covering about ninety percent of the world population, GIDD remains the 
first (macro-micro) global simulation model. Again, GIDD explicitly consider long term 
time horizons during which changes in the demographic structure may become crucial 
components of both growth and distribution dynamics. Similarly, the explicit long-term 
focus of the GIDD can capture the impacts of aging and other demographic changes 
(such as the skill composition of the population) which may become crucial components 
of both and distribution dynamics. Indisputably, economic development is a complex 
process associated with changes in demographic composition, urbanization rates, labor 
market participation, education attainment and saving rates. Although no single model is 
able to capture all the above features and their possible interaction; macro-micro 
simulation models attempt to take into account at least some of the basic mechanisms 
(Bourguignon, et. al. 2005). 
Basically, the distribution 9 of income : at time  can be expressed as the product of 
the joint distribution of all relevant household or individual characteristics  and the 
distribution of income conditional on these characteristic: 
;<&=3 6 	>< 6 ? ? @	&A3 BC	 DEAF G<	&H3IH    (6.1) 
Where ;<&J3 is the density function of the distribution of income and the summation is 
over the domain K&L3 on which L is defined. 
Next, define an income generation model describing household per capita income &M3 
as a function of the household member’s characteristics or endorsements&3, the 
market reward for those characteristic &N3O a set of parameters P	defining labour force 
participation and occupation status&QP3, as well as unobservable components&3:  
=RO< 6 S&LRO< ′T< ′&URO<V<3O WRO<3      (6.2)	
Perhaps, the Household per capita income (or its version accounting for economies of 
scale) is the best proxy for household welfare. Therefore, any economic policy should 
be assessed in terms of its impact on the indicator. Here, vector XJRO< 	 YYYY 	JZO<[ also 
determines the scalar measures of population welfare such as income distribution and 
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poverty. Therefore, the income distribution 9 for a population of \ individuals or 
households at time  can be defined in terms of endowments, prices, labor status and 
unobservable: 
>< 6	 ]JRO< 	 YYYY 	JZO<^ 
= XS&LRO<_T<_&URO<V<3O WRO<3…S&LZO<_T<_&UZO<V<3O WZO<[  (6.3) 
Clearly, the objective of the paper is to define the counterfactual values of endowments, 
prices and labor status. Certainly, this is not a minor task and becomes even more 
challenging when done for African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. In general, figure 
6.1 depicts the scheme of methodological framework of GIDD. However, the GIDD 
framework is likely to have important consequences for economic growth and the 
distribution of income within a given country. Thus, in an increasingly globalizing world, 
the direction and magnitude of these changes can be affected by the changing patterns 
of international flows of goods, services and capital.  
Consequently, in order to capture all of these effects in a consistent way, the GIDD can 
be linked to a global computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to obtain a set of 
counterfactual prices (factor returns) and quantities(factor volumes). Essentially, these 
are the link aggregate variables known, as LAVS (Ferreira et al, 2003). Basically, 
LINKAGE is the CGE model used with the GIDD. Yet, the GIDD micro simulation 
methodology is compatible with any CGE model that has sufficient factor market detail. 
Indeed, LINKAGE is a relatively standard CGE model with many neoclassical features. 
Operationally the model is solved in a recursive-dynamic model in which a series of 
end-of-period equilibriums are linked with a set of equations that update the main macro 
variables.      
 
 
 
  


FIGURE 6.1 METHODOLOGICAL SCHEMES: GIDD FRAMWORK 
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Surely, the three particularly relevant aspects of LINKAGE (for GIDD purposes) are its 
multi-sectoral nature as well as its detailed treatment of factor markets, international 
trade and capital flows). Here, the inclusion of multiple productive activities and multiple 
commodities allow for a rich production and demand structure. Productivity trends are 
sector-specific as well as factor–specific and are calibrated to be consistent with 
historical evidence. Again, the allocation of household budget (for a single 
representative household in each country) across saving and a vector of consumption 
commodities are determined simultaneously through maximization of an extended linear 
expenditure system (ELES). Basically, the system captures various substitution 
possibilities across commodities as well as a gradual shift in demand towards 
commodities with higher income elasticities (such as manufacturing and services) 
overtime. 
Again, production is modeled in a nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
fashion to reflect various substitution possibilities across inputs. Clearly, this allows for a 
rich treatment of factor markets, where returns to factors of production (unskilled and 
skilled labour, capital, land, and natural resources can be type-specific as well as 
sector-specific. Therefore, in standard GIDD applications, capital as well as skilled labor 
is perfectly mobile across sectors within a country; while the market for unskilled labor is 
segmented into farm and non-farm categories. And within each segment, labor is 
perfectly mobile across activities, but mobility across segments is limited by a migration 
function which responds to changes in the farm wage premiums as well as non-farm 
wage premiums. Notably, the LINKAGE model allows for international mobility of labor 
and capital as well as changes in the unemployment rate. Here, international trade is 
modeled using the nested armington specification, in which consumer products are 
differentiated by region of origin and combined using CES functions. On the supply side, 
producers allocate output to domestic and export markets according to constant 
elasticity of transformation (CET) specification. Thus, the global nature of the model 
means that all countries have some degree of market power; goods and services 
markets clear at the international level; and global capital flows are balanced. Therefore, 
the degree of international openness (both trade and capital) affects domestic factor 
prices directly but also has important consequences for the growth of factor productivity. 
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In the first application, the GIDD in conjunction with LINKAGE is used to generate a new 
income distribution for the year 2030 (Bussolo, et.al. 2009). Here, no major policy 
changes are introduced, and the growth assumptions are based on productivity trends 
from the past two decades as well as previous country-specific forecasts. Then, the 
study identifies the drivers of the expected distributional changes by means of two 
complementary approaches. Initially, the analysis is conducted in terms of the 
convergence and dispersion components; that is, changes in income disparities 
between and within countries. As depicted in table 6.I, the results show that the 
reduction in global income inequality between 2000 and 2030 is the outcome of two 
opposing forces: the inequality-reducing convergence effect as well as inequality-
enhancing dispersion effect. 
TABLE 6.1:   GLOBAL INCOME INEQUALITY 
INDEX 2000 2030 DISPERSION 
ONLY 
CONVERGENCE 
ONLY 
GINI 0.672 0.626 0.673 0.625 
THEIL 0.905 0.749 0.904 0.749 
MEAN LOG 
DEVIATION 
0.884 0.764 0.893 0.759 
 
Now even with significant changes of within-country inequality levels, all the potential 
reduction of global inequality can be accounted for by the projected convergence in 
growth rates of average incomes across countries. Again, the aggregate impact of the 
changes of the within-countries component of inequality appears to be minor. However, 
specific countries as well as specific households’ types within countries may experience 
large distributional shifts. Yet, the main cause of local inequality changes is the 
adjustments of factor rewards. Consequently, the developing country members of the 
global middle class are likely to become an increasingly important group within their 
own countries. This will increase their political influence and possibly provide continued 
momentum for policies favoring global integration. 
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In a related application, the GIDD is used to study the income distribution and poverty 
consequences of damages from global warming (Bussolo, et-al, 2008). Here, the 
general equilibrium model with an integrated climate module and links from emissions to 
global temperature is solved through 2050; while climate change damages to 
agricultural productivity are calibrated using estimates in Cline (2007). In order to 
assess the magnitude and incidence of climate change damages, the baseline scenario 
(which incorporates climate feedbacks to agricultural productivity) is constructed with an 
alternative scenario where the damage coefficient is set to zero (that is costless 
mitigation). Clearly, the results show that a temperature increase of approximately one 
degree C above today’s levels could raise the 2050 global moderate poverty headcount 
(two dollars per day poverty line) from 2.85 percent in a scenario with no damages to 
3.01 percent when damages are taken into account. However, the limited global impact 
conceals a wider variation across regions; with increases in poverty ranging from 289, 
000 people in Latin America and Caribbean to 6, 200, 00 people in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Although climate change damages are concentrated in agriculture, the agricultural 
households are not necessarily the most affected. Because the adverse impacts of 
global warming are more pronounced in the poor countries located close to the equator; 
including climate change damages in the analysis results in an increase in the global 
Gini coefficient. Thus, the widening of inequality between countries is partially offset by 
the falling within component due to faster growth in the earnings of agricultural 
households (which tend to be concentrated in the left tail of the national distributions). 
Clearly, these dynamics give rise to the global growth incidence curve in figure 6.2, 
which shows the distribution of per capita income gains if climate change damages 
were zero. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6.2   CLIMATE CHANGE DAMAGES: GLOBAL INCIDENCE 
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Indeed, the above figure shows the percent change in real income or consumption in 
2050 relative to baseline with climate change damages. Because these gains are 
largest between the second and sixth decile of the global income distribution; 
households in this part of the distribution are likely to suffer the most from climate 
change. That is, they have the most to gain if climate change had zero impact on 
agricultural productivity. However, the challenges of assessing plausible worldwide 
distributional implications of growth, large shocks as well as policy changes remain 
daunting. Therefore, the time for action is now. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.0 RESILIENCE POLICY STRATEGIES 
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Conceptually, resilience consists of three capacities that respond to different degrees of 
change or shocks: absorptive capacity, adaptive capacity and transformative capacity. 
The absorptive capacity covers the coping strategies of individuals, households or 
communities that can be used to moderate or buffer the impacts of shocks on their 
livelihoods and basic needs. The adaptive capacity is the ability to learn from 
experience and adjust responses to changing external conditions (while continue 
operating). In contrast, the transformative capacity is the capacity to create a 
fundamentally new system when ecological, economic or social structures make the 
existing system untenable. As shown in figure 7.1, each capacity leads to a different 
outcome: absorptive capacity leads to endurance for continuity. Similarly, adaptive 
capacity leads to incremental adjustments or changes while transformative capacity 
leads to transformational (system-changing responses). Clearly, these three different 
responses can be linked to different intensities of shock or change in a broadly 
hierarchical manner (WEF, 2013; Berkes, 2013; Walker, et al. 2004). Here, the lower 
the intensity of the shock, the more likely the household, community or system will be 
able to resist it effectively; while absorbing its impacts without changing its function, 
status or state. 
 
However, when the shock or stressor exceeds this absorptive capacity, individuals and 
communities will then exercise their adaptive resilience, which involves making 
incremental changes to keep functioning without major qualitative changes in function or 
structure. Critically, these adjustments can take many forms such as connecting to new 
social networks. And yet, if those incremental changes associated with adaptive 
capacity are not enough to prevent a household, community, or system from avoiding 
dire circumstances; then a more substantial transformation must take place. Clearly, 
these changes permanently alter the system or structure in question. Essentially, these 
changes may not always be positive in the long run; even if they prevent people from 
falling into acute poverty that puts their access to basic necessities at risk. Yet, at a 
strategic level, a resilience framework could encourage governments and development 
partners to maintain resilience as a policy and programmatic objective as well as to 
coordinate different agencies and sectors to achieve that objective. In fact, a 
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distinguishing feature of resilience and vulnerability is the potential for complex 
dynamics. Notably, in vulnerable socio economic environments, individuals, households 
and communities are likely to experience dynamic fluctuations in well-being; including a 
mix of long-term trends, cyclical and seasonal shocks as well as major covariate 
shocks. Furthermore, the transitions from one state (such as chronic poverty) into either 
better or worse states are likely to be characterized by a range of threshold effects or 
tipping points. 
 
FIGURE 7.1 RESILIENCE SCHEME: ABSORPTIVE/ADAPTIVE/TRANSFORMATIVE 
CAPACITIES 
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Operationally, resilience requires a multilevel or systemic measurement approach and 
this includes measurement at different levels (individuals, household, community, 
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ecosystem) and among different socioeconomic (ethnic) groups. Again, this requires an 
understanding of how these different identities and factors interact. And beyond the 
household level, systemic factors such as health conditions, social and political 
relationships, culture, agro-ecological factors as well as macroeconomic conditions may 
affect resilience. Obviously, these basic principles have important implications for 
measurement in practice. Therefore, table 7.1 provides a general list of proposed 
indicators that could be used to measure resilience. Perhaps, the most important 
prerequisite for resilience measurement is higher-frequency surveys. Essentially, high-
frequency measurement is a necessary condition for understanding vulnerability and 
resilience. Critically, it helps to identify dynamic initial states such as seasonality, 
cyclicality and exposure to idiosyncratic shocks; differences between pre-shock and 
post-shock states; complex dynamics of coping and adaptation mechanisms; as well as 
the key thresholds that may arise in the transitions between initial and subsequent 
states. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 7.1 RESILIENCE MEASUREMENTS: PROPOSED METRICS 
S/N SAMPLE METRICS S/N RESILIENCE INITIAL SHOCKS AND RESPONSES SUBSEQUENT 
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MEASUREMENT 
PRINCIPLES 
BASIC 
CONDITIONS 
STRESSORS BASIC 
CONDITIONS 
A 
 
B 
C 
D 
E 
F 
 
G 
H 
I 
J 
K 
L 
 
M 
N 
O 
P 
 
Q 
R 
S 
 
T 
U 
V 
W 
X 
Y 
Z 
Food and nutrition 
security 
Health Index 
Assets Index 
Social Capital Index 
Access to Service Index 
Infrastructure 
 
Ecological Index 
Drought/Flood 
Health Shocks 
Political Crises 
Price Volatility 
Trade/Policy Shocks 
 
Illness/Death 
Loss of Income 
Failed Crops 
Livestock Loss 
 
Mitigation Strategies 
Coping Strategies 
Adaptation Strategies 
 
Food and Nutrition Security 
Health Index 
Assets Index 
Social Capital Index 
Access to Services Index 
Infrastructure 
Ecological Index 
I 
II 
 
III 
 
 
 
 
IV 
V 
VI 
VII 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VIII 
 
 
 
IX 
X 
 
XI 
High or appropriate frequency 
Sensitive to Short-term 
variation and critical thresholds 
Measures at many levels 
including household, 
community, village, district 
 
 
High Frequency 
Intertemporal 
Dynamic 
Measured at multiple levels 
from household, Community, 
Village, District, Country level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Measured at multiple levels 
across the systems that affect 
food and nutrition security 
 
High or appropriate frequency 
Sensitive to intertemporal 
variation and critical thresholds 
Measured at many levels 
including households, 
community, village, district. 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
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COVARIATE 
COVARIATE 
COVARIATE 
COVARIATE 
COVARIATE 
 
 
IDIOSYNCRATIC 
IDIOSYNCRATIC 
IDIOSYNCRATIC 
IDIOSYNCRATIC 
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X 
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However, when designing programs to build community resilience, it is important to use 
framework or a set of principle that can be applied to each context that ensures that 
interventions are responsive to environmental idiosyncrasies as well as cultural issues. 
Therefore, resilience requires multidisciplinary thinking and multisectoral approaches. 
Also, it has to work at multiple levels, linking community institutions and governance 
with district governance and service delivery as well as national-level policies and 
strategies. Thus helping sectoral ministries understand and agree on their form of 
collaboration is a key part as illustrated below: 
 
(1) SECTORAL (LINE FUNCTIONING) which involves one sector working alone to 
address a specific problem or need. 
(2) MULTISECTORAL (COOPERATION) which involves two or more sectors bringing 
their separate sectoral expertise to address an issue 
(3) INTERSECTORAL (COLLABORATION) which involves two or more sectors trying to 
understand each other’s methods and approaches in addressing an issue through 
joint planning and some resource sharing. 
(4) TRANS-SECTORAL (INTEGRATION) which involves pulling together resources, 
personnel, strategy and planning. 
 
Indeed, community resilience is an outcome which is about a community’s ability or 
capacity to anticipate, respond to, cope with, and recover from the effects of shocks and 
stresses without resorting to behaviors that negatively affect well-being or compromise 
its long-term prospects of moving out of poverty and hunger. Thus, preventing any 
major c rises requires communities to analyze the crises’ underlying causes as well as 
be involved in the design and implementation of initiatives to address those problems. 
Therefore, these guiding principles may help make resilience program design more 
practical: 
(1) Undertake systemic risk analysis including analysis and planning for future 
uncertainty and worst-case scenarios. 
(2) Reduce the causes of vulnerability by building assets and supporting sustainable 
livelihoods. 
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(3) Address drivers of inequality 
(4) Build up communities’ absorptive and adaptive capacities, including better access to 
safety nets and social protection. 
(5) Support enhanced capacity for effective and timely emergency responses. 
(6) Build institutions for governance while instill a culture of innovation and learning. 
 
In general, the institutional, financial and conceptual walls separating the worlds of 
development as well as humanitarian assistance within donor and UN agencies need to 
be broken down to achieve greater synergies in strategies and implementation plans. 
Again, broader policy coherence for development is a key requirement for efforts to 
strengthen resilience. Here, policies that undermine resilience must be revised. To 
support a pro-poor resilience approach, policy makers should be able to create multi 
annual, flexible mechanisms and funding that facilitate multisectoral approaches to 
tackling chronic sectoral crisis as well as addressing the structural causes of the crisis 
at the regional and country level. Again, the government should review the effectiveness 
of early warning systems in order to identify and address the key institutional (especially 
political) obstacles to early action. Subsequently, they should put in place policy 
responses to the lessons learned from such a review or reviews. Donors should also 
direct more development funding to disaster risk reduction and resilience-building 
interventions (including better-targeted productive safety nets) with either clear 
percentage targets or other funding weighting criteria applied. They should also ensure 
that policies and programs draw on a wide range of expertise such as collaborative, 
multiagency and multisectoral problem analysis. In fact, national governments should 
support the emergence of multi-stakeholder platforms and make active use of such 
forums. In particular, people suffering from a lack of resilience to shocks and stresses 
that affect their security should be consulted. It is essential that wherever possible, 
efforts to strengthen resilience should build on the empowering mechanisms and 
institutions suggested. 
 
Obviously, a resilience perspective can encourage development programming that 
factor in uncertainty and volatility as well as humanitarian programming that works 
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toward sustainable development. Here, some programs can incorporate both objectives 
by: 
(a) Providing relief and then seeking to gradually build individual, household, and 
community assets; or by 
(b) Building assets in normal times but incorporating financial and operational flexibility 
into programs to allow them to switch quickly to relief operations when shocks hit. 
 
Critically, development programs aiming to enhance resilience should build local 
capacities and strengthen local structures. Surely, it is those structures that have the 
potential to develop the most effective and timely support when shocks and stresses 
strike. Here, emergence programs should not work in parallel with these structures but 
rather work with and build on them to avoid locking communities as well as countries 
into a humanitarian approach. Indeed, nongovernmental organizations and their 
national partners should use their long-term experience in development programming 
more proactively to lobby for resilience-enhancing policy change. Consequently, 
building resilience and reducing inequalities need to become national priorities and 
hence be embedded in national development plans or strategic frameworks. 
 
Finally, the central objective of any future ACP cooperation should be poverty reduction 
and ultimately its eradication; sustainable development; and progressive integration of 
ACP countries into the world economy. In this context, cooperation framework and 
orientations should be tailored to the individual circumstances of each ACP country; 
should promote local ownership of economic and social reforms as well as the 
integration of the private sector and civil society actors into the development process. 
Any cooperation should also refer to the conclusions of the United Nations Conferences 
as well as to the objectives, targets and action programmes agreed at international level 
and to their follow up as a basis for development principles. It should also refer to the 
international development cooperation targets and paying particular attention to putting 
in place qualitative and quantitative indicators of progress. 
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8.0 CONCLUSION 
 
Indeed, after 2015, we should move from reducing to ending extreme poverty as well as 
ensuring that no person is denied universal human rights and basic economic 
opportunities. Thus, we should design goals that focus on reaching excluded groups 
such as by providing social protection to help people build resilience to life’s 
uncertainties. Surely, we can be the first generation in human history to end hunger and 
ensure that every person achieves a basic standard of well being. Therefore, this is a 
universal agenda for which everyone must accept their proper share of responsibility. 
We believe that these changes are right, smart, and necessary thing to do. But their 
impact will depend on how they are translated into specific priorities and actions. 
Clearly, we believe that these fundamental shifts can remove the barriers that hold 
back, and end the inequality of opportunity that blights the lives of so many people on 
our planet. At long last, they can bring together social, economic and environmental 
issues in a coherent, effective and sustainable way. 
 
Certainly, this is a world of challenges, but these challenges can also present 
opportunities, if they kindle a new spirit of solidarity, mutual respect and mutual benefit 
(based on our common humanity and Rio principles). Here, such a spirit could inspire 
us to address global challenges through a new global partnership; bringing together the 
many groups in the world concerned with economic, social and environmental progress. 
It also include people living in poverty, women, young people, people with disabilities, 
indigenous and local communities, marginalized groups, multi lateral institutions, local 
and national governments, businesses, civil society, private philanthropists, scientists 
and other academics. Notably, these groups are more organized than before, better 
able to communicate with each other, willing to learn about real experiences as well as 
real challenges in policymaking committed to solving problems. 
 
Ending poverty is not a matter for aid or international cooperation alone. It is an 
essential part of sustainable development, in developed and developing countries. 
Here, developed countries have a great responsibility to keep the promises they have 
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made to help the less fortunate. Although, aid is vital to developing economies, they still 
need more other assistance. In fact, developed countries can co-operate more 
effectively to stem aggressive tax avoidance and evasion as well as illicit capital flows. 
Here, governments can work with business to create a more coherent, transparent and 
equitable system for collecting corporate tax in a globalized world. On one hand, they 
can tighten the enforcement of rules that prohibits companies from bribing foreign 
officials. On the other hand, they can prompt their large multinational corporations to 
report on the social, environmental and economic impact of their activities. 
 
In the same way, developing countries have a vital part to play in the transformative 
shifts that are needed. They must make smart choices to turn cities into vibrant places 
full of opportunities, services and different lifestyles (where people want to work and 
live). Therefore, pursuing a single sustainable development agenda is the right thing 
(smart thing) and necessary thing to do. Yet, freedom from conflict and violence is the 
most fundamental human entitlement as well as the essential foundation for building 
peaceful and prosperous societies. At the same time, people want their governments to 
be transparent, accountable and responsive to their needs. Thus, capable and 
responsive states need to build effective and accountable public institutions that support 
the rule of law, freedom of speech and the media, open political choice as well as 
access to justice. Therefore, we need a transparency revolutions as well as 
governments that tackle the causes of poverty, empower people and permit scrutiny of 
their affairs. 
 
Basically, most of the money to finance sustainable development will come from 
domestic sources and therefore countries are urged to continue efforts to invest in 
stronger tax systems, broaden their domestic tax base and build local financial markets. 
But developing countries will also need substantial external funding. Although aid 
remains vital for low-income countries (such as ACP countries), the most important 
source of long-term finance will be private capital, coming from major pension funds, 
mutual funds, sovereign wealth funds, private corporations, Development banks, as well 
as other investors (including those of MICs). In fact, these private capital flows will grow 
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and become less prone to sudden surges and stops, given that the global financial 
system is stable and well regulated. Again, the financed projects should be backstopped 
by international financial institutions. 
 
However, if the newly suggested development agenda is to be truly transformational, 
there are several major risks to be managed. Consequently, the development partners 
should ensure that proposed sustainable development agenda is not over-loaded with 
too many priorities. Again, to ensure that the new agenda is not past-focusing, 
insufficiently stretching, unworkably utopians and non-compelling. Rather, the proposed 
agenda should be oriented towards future challenges, intellectually coherent as well as 
compendium of well connected goals. Finally, we urge all nations of the world to 
acknowledge the fact that spiritual growth in GOD is the basic human foundation for 
prosperity and general well being. 
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